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THE FLORIDA GRAND JURY: ABOLITION OR REFORM?
I. INTRODUCTION
The grand jury is one of the oldest institutions in our legal system.
It has been a part of Anglo-American criminal justice for over 800
years. It exists in some form in every state as well as in the federal
system. But the grand jury's long history and widespread acceptance
cannot, in and of themselves, serve as the sole rationale for its con-
tinued existence.
The first part of this note will examine the grand jury both in
Florida and generally. The note will then present the arguments for
and against maintaining the grand jury as presently established by
the Florida Constitution. This author concludes that the justifications
for maintaining the grand jury in Florida are outweighed by the argu-
ments against it. The grand jury no longer serves the vital functions
for which it was designed. Indeed, instead of protecting the people,
it is often used to diminish individual rights. The grand jury has out-
lived its usefulness, and it should be abolished.
If the Florida grand jury system is not abolished, then certain pro-
cedural safeguards must be provided to protect the rights of persons
who come into contact with the grand jury. This note considers two
major areas of grand jury reform: first, the right of a witness to have
counsel present with him in the grand jury room; second, the relative
merits of use immunity and transactional immunity as applied to a
witness compelled to give grand jury testimony.
Finally, in light of the foregoing discussion, various proposals will
be made for revising the grand jury provisions of the Florida Constitu-
tion.
II. HISTORY OF THE GRAND JURY
The grand jury originated in England at the Assize of Clarendon
in 1166.1 Its main purpose was to investigate crimes and hand down
indictments, but it also acted as an important buffer between the people
and the Crown. Since that time, the grand jury system has been hailed
by proponents as an essential guardian of justice and liberty.2 This
was undoubtedly the feeling of the Framers of the United States
Constitution. They thought so highly of the grand jury institution
1. Note, Should the Grand Jury Indictment Procedure Be Abolished in Illinois?,
2 JOHN MARSHALL J. OF PRAC. AND PROC. 348 (1969). For an excellent history of the
development of the grand jury, see R. YOUNGER, THE PEOPLE'S PANEL (1963).
2. See Wickersham, The Grand Jury, 38 N.Y. ST. B.J. 426 (1966); Wickersham,
The Grand Jury: Weapon Against Crime and Corruption, 51 A.B.A.J. 1157 (1965);
Comment, 8 MIAMI L.Q. 584 (1954).
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that they included it as a basic guarantee in the Bill of Rights.3 The
grand jury guarantee of the federal constitution is one of the few
protections in the Bill of Rights that has not, by incorporation into
the fourteenth amendment, been applied to the states.4 Nevertheless,
most states have adopted a grand jury system either by constitution or
statute.5
The grand jury system has existed in Florida by constitutional pro-
vision since 1838. In the 1838 constitution 6 and the 1861 constitution,'
the grand jury provision stated: "[N]o person shall be put to
answer any criminal charge but by presentment, indictment or im-
peachment." The 1865 constitution provided that all criminal charges
had to be prosecuted by presentment, indictment, or impeachment
except where the legislature provided otherwise." But where the
criminal charge involved the "life of the accused," a grand jury present-
ment or indictment was required. 9 The 1868 constitution further
changed the grand jury provision, providing that all "capital or other-
wise infamous crimes" were to be prosecuted by indictment or present-
ment. 10 Only for petit larceny could the legislature exercise its dis-
cretion as to the type of charging instrument."
The grand jury provision in the 1885 constitution was very similar
to the 1868 version. It provided that prosecutions for capital crimes or
other felonies must be upon grand jury indictment or presentment
unless provided otherwise in the constitution.12 Members of the bar
clamored for an amendment that would allow all non-capital felonies
to be prosecuted under an indictment or information.' 3 Finally, the
constitution was amended in 1933 to provide that all non-capital
felonies may be prosecuted by indictment or information.14 The re-
3. U.S. CONST. amend. V provides in relevant part:
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime,
unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising
in the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in actual service in time of
War or public danger ....
4. Peters v. Kiff, 407 U.S. 493, 496 (1972); Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516 (1884).
5. See Appendix I, containing a breakdown of the state grand jury provisions.
6. FLA. CONST. art. I, § 16 (1838).
7. FLA. CONST. art. I, § 16 (1861).
8. FLA. CONST. art. I, § 16 (1865).
9. Id.
10. FLA. CONST. art. I, § 8 (1868).
11. Id.
12. FLA. CONST. art. I, § 10 (1885, as originally adopted).
13. See Henderson, Discussion Of Criminal Prosecution On Information Instead of
by Indictment, 5 FLA. B.J. 287 (1931). The author discusses the efforts of the Florida
Bar to have the 1885 Constitution grand jury provision amended.
14. Act of June 7, 1933, H.J.R. No. 152, 1933 FLA. LAws'895.
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quirement that an indictment be returned for capital crimes re-
mained.15
The 1968 revision of the constitution contained a grand jury pro-
vision very similar to the 1885 provision, as amended. It too requires an
indictment only for capital crimes; all other felonies may be prosecuted
by indictment or information.16 It is this author's conclusion that the
Florida grand jury system is unnecessary and should probably be
abolished. If this is done, Florida's 1978 constitution should provide
that all criminal prosecutions be initiated by information filed by the
state's attorney.
III. ABOLITION OF THE GRAND JURY
Despite the long history and widespread acceptance of the grand
jury indictment process, it has nevertheless been the subject of extensive
criticism.1 As early as the nineteenth century, legal philosopher Jeremy
Bentham was labeling the grand jury " 'an engine of corruption,' a
body composed of 'a miscellaneous company of men' untrained in the
law, and a system which had outlived its usefulness for over a cen-
tury."' 8 Indeed, the grand jury indictment process was abolished by
statute in England in 1933.'1
In reviewing the modern criticisms of the grand jury system, it is
helpful to look at the various arguments made in support of the grand
jury. One of the major arguments for maintaining the grand jury is
that it protects against abuses by an overzealous prosecutor.s° The
notion is that an unscrupulous prosecutor, moved by improper motives,
might charge a crime without having a proper basis. The grand jury,
it is argued, serves as a check on this potential abuse. Critics are quick
15. FLA. CONST. art. I, § 10 (1885, as amended 1933).
16. FLA. CONST. art. I, § 15(a).
17. See, e.g., Bickner, The Grand Jury . . .A Layman's Assessment .... 48 CAL. ST.
B.J. 660 (1973); Calkins, Abolition of the Grand Jury Indictment in Illinois, 1966 U.
ILL. L.F. 423; Duff & Harrison, The Grand Jury In Illinois: To Slaughter A Sacred
Cow, 1973 U. ILL. L.F. 635; Johnston, The Grand jury-Prosecutorial Abuse of the In-
dictment Process, 65 J. CirM. L. & C. 157 (1974).
18. Calkins, supra note 17, at 423, quoting J. BENTHAM, THE ELEMENTS OF THE ART
OF PACKING, As APPLIED TO SPECIAL JURIES 26 (1821); 2 THE WORKS OF JEREMY BENTHAM
171 (Bowring ed. 1843) (footnotes omitted).
19. The Administration of Justice (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act, 1933, 23 & 24
Geo. 5, c. 36, § 1. In 1913, a committee chaired by Viscount St. Aldwyn recommended
the abolition of the grand jury. It noted that the grand jury "had outlived the circum-
stances amongst which it sprang and developed, that it is little more than a historically
interesting survival, . . . and further, that it uselessly puts the country to considerable
expense and numerous persons to great inconvenience." Royal Commission on Delay
in the King's Bench Division, quoted in Elliff, Notes on the Abolition of the English
Grand Jury, 29 J. CGaM. L.C. & P.S. 3, 14 (1938-39).
20. See Duff & Harrison and Johnston, supra note 17.
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to dispute this claim. They assert that in reality, the grand jury pro-
vides no such protective function, but is merely a "rubber stamp" of
approval for prosecutors' desires.21 One author has stated that the grand
jury lost its protective function because of its total dependence on the
prosecutor. 2 She points out that the grand jury from the outset is in
closest contact with the prosecutor. The grand jury depends on the
prosecutor to present it with cases to consider, to present evidence, to
call witnesses, and to draft indictments.23 More importantly, the grand
jury must depend on the prosecutor's legal research and interpretation
of statutes and case law. The grand jury is almost always composed
of laypersons, and there is rarely any chance for the grand jury to hire
its own independent counsel. 24 Professor Bickner has concluded:
As a result, in contradiction to its much-publicized autonomy, the
grand jury is organizationally structured to be totally dependent
on the district attorney-not only in fulfilling its criminal functions,
but even in fulfilling the investigative role. In many instances, a
'grand jury investigation' is essentially a 'district attorney investiga-
tion.' 25
21. Meshbesher, Right to Counsel Before Grand Jury, 41 F.R.D. 189 (1966).
22. Bickner, supra note 17, at 666.
23. Consider, for example, the following Florida statutory provisions:
Whenever required by the grand jury, the state attorney shall attend them for
the purpose of examining witnesses in their presence, or of giving legal advice
in any matter before them; and he shall prepare bills of indictment.
FLA. STAT. § 27.03 (1975).
The state attorney or an assistant state attorney shall attend sessions of the grand
jury to examine witnesses and give legal advice about any matter cognizable by
the grand jury. The state attorney may designate one or more assistant state
attorneys to accompany and assist him in the performance of his duties, or he
may designate one or more assistant state attorneys to attend sessions, examine
witnesses, and give legal advice to the grand jury. The state attorney or an assistant
state attorney shall draft indictments.
FLA. STAT. § 905.19 (1975).
A State Attorney designated by the Governor with the approval of the Supreme
Court shall attend sessions of the grand jury and serve as its legal advisor. The
State Attorney, the State Attorney and one or more of his assistant state attorneys,
or one or more assistant state attorneys shall examine witnesses, present evidence,
and draft indictments, presentments, and reports upon the direction of the state-
wide grand jury. The State Attorney may designate one or more assistant state
attorneys to accompany and assist him in the performance of his duties, or he
may designate one or more assistant state attorneys to attend sessions of the state-
wide grand jury and perform such duties.
FLA. STAT. § 905.36 (1975).
24. Even if the grand jury desired to hire its own private counsel, that counsel
would not be allowed to sit in on the proceedings. FiA. STAT. § 905.17 (1975).
25. Bickner, supra note 17, at 666. See Antell, The Modern Grand Jury: Benighted
Supergovernment, 51 A.B.A.J. 153, 154 (1965).
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As a general rule, prosecutors are ethical and proceed within the
bounds of the law, with or without a grand jury. But the prosecutor's
traditional dominance of the grand jury26 makes it unlikely that the
grand jury would provide much protection against unethical behavior.
Grand juries almost always indict when cases are presented to them,
especially if the prosecutor indicates that an indictment should be
returned.2 7 As one commentator, speaking of the prosecutor's dominance
over the grand jury, noted:
Almost without exception the grand jurors know only the facts
of the case that the state's attorney chooses to present, and almost
invariably grand jurors follow the wishes of the prosecutor as to
who shall be indicted and who shall not be indicted. In fact, it is
now quite safe to say that the reliability of the grand jury runs just
about parallel with the reliability of the state's attorney. This is
not . . . an attempt to indicate anything but a sincere effort on
the part of either, but if the state's attorney is to so much govern
the grand jury, why not let him exercise his discretion quickly by
means of an information.28
It has been suggested that prosecutorial abuses can be controlled
better by means other than the grand jury. One author proposed
three alternatives: (1) giving the courts discretionary power to super-
vise the activities of prosecutors; (2) extending a governor's suspension
powers to include abuse of prosecutorial discretion; (3) depending
upon an informed citizenry to oust an abusive prosecutor from office.29
A second major argument made by grand jury proponents is that
the grand jury, because of the secrecy of its proceedings, protects the
accused's reputation and good name. The secrecy that surrounds the
grand jury proceedings is a double-edged sword, however; although
the general public cannot hear the testimony, neither can the accused.
The complaining witness can testify in secrecy without fear of being
cross-examined by the accused; the accused has no right to appear and
26. See Gelber, The Grand Jury Looks at Itself, 45 FLA. B.J. 576 (1971). In this
study, the author submitted several questions to citizens who had served on grand
juries. One question asked: "Do you believe the state attorney, as counsel for the grand
jury, exercises too much influence over grand jury action?" Forty-three percent of those
questioned responded affirmatively. Id. at 577.
27. One author has noted:
In a survey conducted by Dean Morse he found that in 6,453 cases where the
prosecutor expressed his opinion to the grand jury as to what disposition should
be made of the case, the grand jury disagreed with the prosecutor in only 5.39%
of the cases, and in the cases of disagreement the grand jury tended not to indict.
Note, supra note 1, at 358.
28. Canfield, Have We Outgrown the Grand Jury? 40 ILL. B.J. 206, 209 (1951).
29. Calkins, supra note 17, at 432.
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give his version of the story.30 In addition, if the accused is called to
testify before the grand jury, he has no constitutional right to have
his counsel in the grand jury room to advise him during question-
ing.s' A further indication of the lack of protection provided for the
accused is the fact that the normal rules of evidence do not apply in
grand jury proceedings. Therefore, an indictment may be based on
hearsay or other evidence that would not be admissible at trial.3 2
A third argument advanced by grand jury advocates is that grand
jury secrecy gives the state a double advantage.33 First, proponents assert
that witnesses will be more willing to testify if they know that their
testimony will not be disclosed and they will be safe from harass-
ment. Second, secrecy guards against the accused fleeing the jurisdic-
tion to avoid prosecution.
The secrecy argument can be attacked on several grounds. First,
the accused usually knows the identity of the complaining witness.
Moreover, even if the identity of the complaining witness is protected
by the grand jury, it is very likely that he will be required to testify
at trial. One writer explains that "any hesitancy that a witness might
have in divulging harmful evidence before the grand jury would be
based upon the fear that eventually he must give that same evidence
in open court. ' '3 4 A third criticism is that secrecy does not deter the
accused from suborning witnesses. Although the accused cannot hear
the witness testify before the grand jury, many states, including Florida,
allow the accused to discover witness lists prior to trial.3 5 If he wants
to threaten or bribe witnesses, the accused can simply refer to the
witness list; the grand jury is an ineffective protection here. Still
another argument against the grand jury secrecy is that the element of
surprise has no place in any trial, especially in a criminal prosecu-
tion.3 6 It should also be noted that the purported benefits of secrecy
30. Id.; see FLA. STAT. § 905.17 (1975), which provides that only the witness, the
state attorney and his assistants, the court reporter, and an interpreter may be present
in the grand jury room.
31. In re Groban, 352 U.S. 330 (1957).
32. E.g., United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338 (1974) (evidence seized in violation
of fourth amendment admissible); Costello v. United States, 350 U.S. 359 "(1956) (hearsay
evidence admissible). But see In re Grand Jury Investigation, 287 So. 2d 43 (Fla. 1973)
(communications intercepted by an illegal wiretap are not admissible before a grand
jury).
33. See Calkins, supra note 17, at 433-35.
34. Id. at 434 (footnote omitted).
35. See FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.220(a)(I)(i), which requires the prosecutor, after the filing
of an indictment or information, to divulge the names and addresses of all persons
having relevant information about the offense. Note that this discovery grant is not
limited to those witnesses whom the state will call at trial.
36. See Calkins, supra note 17, at 434-35. Justice Traynor has written:
It is time to ask whether the element of surprise they set such store by is not
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will not be lost if the grand jury is abolished. The same secrecy pro-
tections are guaranteed when the prosecutor files an information. The
complaining witness can testify in secrecy, and with reasonably con-
fidential matters, the accused will not know of the pending investiga-
tion. Thus it appears that the information process preserves secrecy
values as well as the grand jury does.
A final argument in favor of the grand jury is that it acts as a buffer
between the prosecutor and the public when the crime under investiga-
tion is unpopular or notorious. In such an instance, the prosecutor
can take the case to the grand jury and let them bear the responsibility
of refusing to indict.3 7 Considering the domination that the prosecutor
has over the grand jury, it seems clear that he could subtly persuade
the grand jury to act as he wishes and then pin any public opprobrium
on its members.
The fact that the state attorney-an elected official-can use the
grand jury to sidestep public pressure is a questionable justification
for retaining the grand jury. Although the present process may remove
some pressure from the state attorney, it may also mislead the public
as to who is making the accusation.
It appears that the prosecutor's ability to hide behind the grand
jury is subject to two abuses. First, when there is insufficient evidence,
the prosecutor can persuade the grand jury to indict and thus free
himself from the responsibility of bringing the charges. One commenta-
tor noted:
[T]he grand jury may well be, in given circumstances, the skirt
behind which an over-zealous or malicious or even corrupt prosecutor
may hide to destroy the accused in the white-hot light of public
accusation, without merit, and without fear of retribution in the
form of a suit for malicious prosecution.38
The second type of abuse is just the opposite. If the prosecutor does
not really want to pursue a case, he can present the case to a grand
one of the most overrated elements in the judicial process. It is one thing to
acknowledge its usefulness in testing credibility, but quite another to glorify it
as the keystone of the adversary system. If it were indeed the keystone, the arch
would in truth be fallen. The truth is most likely to emerge when each side
seeks to take the other by reason rather than by surprise. The more open the
process for eliciting it, the less need there is of surprise.
Traynor, Ground Lost and Found in Criminal Discovery, 39 N.Y.U.L. REv. 228, 249
(1964).
37. A collateral argument is that the grand jury serves a vital investigatory function.
In Florida, however, the state attorney has subpoena power and can adequately perform
the investigatory duties. See FLA. STAT. § 27.04 (1975).
38. Kranitz, The Grand Jury, Past-Present-No Future, 24 Mo. L. lxv. 318, 328
(1959). See Calkins, supra note 17, at 436.
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jury in such a way as to guarantee that they will not return an indict-
ment. Once again, the prosecutor can point to the grand jury as the
responsible party. Admittedly both of these premises are based on the
notion that the prosecutor can manipulate the grand jury to follow his
own desires, but it is a notion which has been given broad support by
legal scholars.30
The current Florida Constitution provides that all capital crimes
must be prosecuted by indictment.40 All other felonies may be prose-
cuted either by indictment or information.4 1 One of the leading Florida
cases dealing with grand jury indictments is State v. Hernandez.4 2 In
Hernandez, the trial court quashed two informations charging drug
law violations. The lower court reasoned that "organic due process"
precluded prosecution of a crime without an indictment or a prelimi-
nary hearing. The Supreme Court of Florida disagreed, holding instead
that there was no constitutional requirement to indict except for capital
39. See notes 25-28 and accompanying text supra.
This type of abuse is illustrated by a recent incident in Lake City, Florida:
[I]n July of 1976 the city's mayor, James Ward, abruptly resigned one night after
completing about a year on the job. He said he had been getting telephone calls
from drug pushers, gamblers and men who wanted to set up houses of prostitution
in Lake City-and that he was afraid for his family's safety.
Ward's announcement was a political bombshell for his home town.
Politicians angrily denied that there was any kind of "organized" crime in
the Lake City area. A local grand jury was hastily called into session. It met for
two days, then issued a presentment critical of Ward and the local newspaper,
which had published his remarks along with a story saying many Lake City
residents believed the resigning mayor.
The Jury returned its presentment to Circuit Judge Samuel S. Smith, whose
office in the Columbia County Courthouse was located a few doors down from
the grand jury room. Smith read the presentment, signed it, and released it to
the public.
With that, the talk of gambling and prostitution around Lake City died
down. The community went about its business.
Tallahassee Democrat, December 18, 1977, § B, at 1, col. 4. A federal investigation
followed. Judge Smith was indicted and convicted of possession of marijuana.
Meantime, FBI agents were combing through hundreds of court cases from
the Third Judicial Circuit, looking for signs of wrongdoing in the past.
They found them.
When the FBI's work was done, it concluded that the area's judicial system had
been riddled with corruption.
Id. § B, at 5, col. 1.
40. FLA. CONST. art. I, § 15(a) provides:
No person shall be tried for a capital crime without presentment or indictment by
a grand jury, or for other felony without such presentment or indictment or
an information under oath filed by the prosecuting officer of the court, except
persons on active duty in the militia when tried by court martial.
41. Id.
42. 217 So. 2d 109 (Fla. 1968). This case construed the 1885 Constitution's grand
jury provision, which was very similar to the current grand jury section. See text
accompanying notes 14-16 supra.
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crimes. The court cited Hurtado v. California4 3 with approval, noting
that the grand jury requirements of the federal system do not apply
to the states.44 Likewise, the Florida Supreme Court in Homer v.
State4 5 refused to hold violative of the federal constitution the pro-
vision of the 1885 constitution that dealt with grand jury indictments.
In Hall v. State," the Supreme Court of Florida addressed the
rationale behind the constitutional guarantee of indictment only for
capital offenses:
The undoubted benefits arising from the continued presence and
functioning in each judicial circuit of some trained and responsible
prosecuting officer representing the state, vested with the very grave
but necessary authority of initiating prosecutions by way of informa-
tion, is no doubt the primary reason for the adoption of [the 1885
constitution's grand jury provision]. One of these benefits has been
the reduction of the expense and the avoidance of the delay in-
curred in the frequent summoning of grand juries where prompt
prosecutions for the commission of felonies is essential to the efficient
administration of justice.47
Thus, early on, the Florida Supreme Court recognized that prosecut-
ing cases by information saved time and money.
Another line of cases in Florida has held that a prosecutor may file
an information, even though the grand jury failed or refused to
indict.48 Recall that one of the arguments advanced for maintaining
the grand jury is that it protects the accused from being charged with
a crime for which there is no basis. 4 But, if the prosecutor can charge
by information even when the grand jury refuses to indict, the pro-
tective role of the grand jury is undermined. In Florida, therefore, if
there is any merit to the argument that the grand jury protects the
accused, it would only apply in capital cases. Only in capital cases
would the prosecutors be unable to prosecute by information if the
grand jury refused to indict.50
No state has completely abolished the grand jury indictment pro-
cess; 5 however, many states have receded from the federal requirement
43. 110 U.S. 516 (1884). See text accompanying note 4 supra.
44. 217 So. 2d at 109.
45. 168 So. 2d 137 (Fla. 1964).
46. 187 So. 392 (Fla. 1939).
47. Id. at 399.
48. State ex rel. Hardy v. Blount, 261 So. 2d 172 (Fla. 1972); State ex rel. Latour
v. Stone, 185 So. 729 (Fla. 1939).
49. See note 20 and accompanying text supra.
50. FLA. CONsT. art. I, § 15(a).
51. See Appendix.
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of indictments for all felonies. At this writing, twenty-four states allow
all crimes, including felonies, to be prosecuted by either indictment
or information. 52 Six other states allow all but major felonies (usually
capital or life imprisonment crimes) to be prosecuted by either indict-
ment or information.53 The remaining states require felonies to be
prosecuted by indictment, 54 although several of these provide that
the accused may waive his right to indictment. 55
It appears that there may be a trend among the states toward the
use of the information for initiating criminal prosecutions. In a 1966
article, the author noted that twenty-four states required indictments
for felony prosecutions, while twenty-two allowed prosecution of all
crimes to be initiated by either indictment or information."6 A recent
review of the various state provisions indicates that now only twenty
states require indictments for all felonies, and twenty-four states allow
all crimes to be prosecuted by either indictment or information.
57
In conclusion, it appears that there is no legitimate reason for
perpetuating the grand jury indictment process in Florida. The asserted
rationale for maintaining the grand jury simply do not, in reality, exist.
The grand jury does not protect the individual from the overzealous
prosecutor, because the grand jury is dominated by and dependent
upon the state attorney. Instead of acting in its historic role as a
buffer between the individual and the state, the grand jury all too
often acts as a shield for the prosecutor, allowing him to camouflage his
52. ARIZ. CONsT. art. II, § 30; ARK. CONST. art II, § 8, as amended by amend. 21 § 1;
CAL. CoNST. art I, § 14; COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 16-5-10 (1973); IDAHO CONST. art. I, §
8; ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, §§ 111-112 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1977); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-3.1-
1-1 (Burns 1975); IOWA CODE ANN. § 769.1 (West Supp. 1977); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN.
ch. 263, § 4 (West Supp. 1977); ME. CONST. art. I, § 17; MICH. CoMP. LAWS ANN. § 767.1
(1968); MONT. CONST. art. I, § 20; NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-1601 (1975); NEV. CONST. art. I, §
8; N.M. CONsT. art. II, § 14; N.D. RuLE CuM. P. 7(a); OKLA. CONST. art. 2, § 17; S.C.
CONST. art. I, § 11; S.D. CONST. art. VI, § 10; UTAH CONST. art. I, § 13; VT. R. CRIM. P.
7(a); WASH. CONST. art. I, § 25; Wisc. STAT. ANN. § 967.05(3) (West 1971); Wyo. STAT.
ANN. § 7-118 (1959).
53. CONN. CONST. art. I, § 8; FLA. CONsT. art. I, § 15(a); LA. CONST. art. I, § 15; MD.
CODE ANN. § 23-592; MINN. R. CRIM. P. 17.01 (1977); R.I. CONsT. amend. 40, § 1.
54. ALA. CONsT. art. I, § 8, and amend. 37; ALAS. CONST. art. I, § 8; DEL. CONST.
art. I, § 8; GA. CODE ANN. § 27-704; HAWAII CONST. art. I, § 8; KAN. STAT. ANN. §
22-23-03 (1974); KY. CONST. Bill of Rights, § 12; ME. CONST. art. I, § 7; MISS. CONST.
art. III, § 27; N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 601:1 (1974); N.J. CONST. art. I, § 8; N.Y. CONST.
art. I, § 6; N.C. CONsT. art. I, § 22; OHIO CONST. art. I, § 10; ORE. CONST. art. VII (amend-
ed), § 5; PA. CONsT. art. I, § 10; TENN. CONST. art. I, § 14; TEX. CONST. art. I, § 10; VA.
CODE ANN. § 19.2-217 (1975); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 62-2-1 (1977).
55. See, e.g., ALAS. CONsT. art. I, § 8; N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 601:1 (1974); N.C.
CONST. art. I, § 22; VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-217 (1975).
56. Calkins, supra note 17, at 424 n.6.
57. See notes 34-35 supra. For an examination of the various state provisions, see
Appendix I.
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own role in certain prosecutions. Finally, it should be reiterated that
whatever the merits of closed grand jury proceedings, secrecy of
accusatory proceedings can just as easily be guaranteed through the
information process.
The Florida grand jury system is unnecessary and should be
abolished. As a substitute provision, the Florida Constitution should
provide that all criminal prosecutions are to be initiated by informa-
tion filed by the state attorney. Admittedly, such a proposal would be
a novel step; the fact that no other state has completely abolished the
grand jury indicates that the grand jury idea dies hard. Nevertheless,
it seems that grand jury abolition is a step which would not impair
the criminal justice process in Florida.
IV. PROTECTION OF RIGHTS UPON RETENTION
OF THE GRAND JURY SYSTEM
The grand jury system is no longer of much value and should be
abolished. If Florida retains the grand jury system, however, certain
procedural safeguards should be provided to protect the rights of those
who are called to testify before a grand jury. While many reforms
could be suggested, this note will deal with two major reform proposals
that have recently received much attention.
A grand jury reform package was approved by the American Bar
Association at its annual convention in August, 1977.58 Two of the
twenty-seven parts of the ABA proposal were especially controversial.
The first dealt with a witness' right to have counsel present with him
in the grand jury room when he testifies" The second proposed trans-
actional immunity for those witnesses who are compelled to testify
before the grand jury.60 This part of the note will examine and evalu-
ate only the counsel and immunity questions-two of the most significant
and controversial grand jury reform subjects. But that is not to suggest
that these proposals should be considered to the exclusion of other
grand jury reforms. Many other meritorious grand jury reform pro-
posals exist and are currently being debated. 61
A. A Witness' Right to Counsel Before a Grand Jury
1. Under the Federal Constitution. The United States Supreme
58. ABA Annual Meeting, 46 U.S.L.W. 2089 (August 23, 1977).
59. See Report to the ABA House of Delegates, Section of Criminal Justice, Recom-
mendation Number 1, approved August 9, 1977.
60. See id., Recommendation Number 17.
61. See generally Report to the ABA House of Delegates, Section of Criminal Justice,
approved August 9, 1977.
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Court has never recognized a witness' federal constitutional right
to have counsel present inside the grand jury room. In fact, it has
indicated that a grand jury witness has no such right.62 Theoretically,
however, at least two constitutional avenues could lead to a right
to counsel before grand juries.
The first approach concerns the right to counsel guaranteed by the
sixth amendment of the United States Constitution. As will be de-
veloped below, the Supreme Court has historically interpreted the
sixth amendment right to counsel as attaching at any level of the
criminal proceeding that is a "critical stage." 63 Arguably, a grand jury
proceeding, especially when the witness is the putative or "target"
defendant, is a "critical stage." The Supreme Court has rejected this
argument, however, and recently held that the sixth amendment right
to counsel only attaches "at or after the time that adversary judicial
proceedings have been initiated .... "64
The alternative approach to a right to counsel before a grand jury
under the federal constitution involves the fifth amendment right
against self-incrimination. In Miranda v. Arizona, 5 the Supreme
Court determined that under the fifth amendment, an accused has a
right to have counsel present whenever he is subjected to a "custodial
interrogation." The Miranda rationale was that for an accused to in-
telligently assert his self-incrimination privilege, he needed the
assistance of counsel. Logically, this rationale could be extended to
include witnesses testifying before grand juries, especially when they
are "target" defendants.
This section of the note will examine these two federal constitu-
tional arguments. It will then look at the limited extent to which
the federal courts have allowed a grand jury witness to consult with
counsel.
Since the adoption of the fifth amendment, its grand jury guarantee
has been construed to mean that no federal felony can be charged
without an indictment.6 6 But the fifth amendment right to grand jury
indictment is one of the guarantees in the Bill of Rights that has
not been incorporated and made binding upon the states.6 7 The states
are therefore free to prosecute felonies without a grand jury indict-
ment.
62. United States v. Mandujano, 425 U.S. 564, 581 (1976); Anonymous v. Baker,
360 U.S. 287 (1959); see In re Groban, 352 U.S. 330 (1957).
63. See notes 69-75 and accompanying text infra.
64. Kirby v. illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 688 (1972).
65. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
66. Harvin v. United States, 445 F. 2d 675 (D.C. Cir. 1971); see FED. R. CIuM. P. 7(a).
67. Peters v. Kiff, 407 U.S. 493, 496 (1972); Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516 (1884).
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The sixth amendment right to counsel provides in relevant part:
"In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall .. . have the Assistance
of Counsel for his defence." Unlike the right to grand jury indictment,
the sixth amendment right to counsel has been incorporated by the
fourteenth amendment and is binding on the states. 6 For many years,
the United States Supreme Court has debated the appropriate scope
of the sixth amendment right to counsel. Powell v. Alabama69 was one
of its earliest and broadest statements on the subject. There the Court
said that a person accused of a crime "requires the guiding hand of
counsel at every step in the proceedings against him." 70 Then, during
the 1960's and the years of the Warren Court, the Supreme Court
began to view the sixth amendment right to counsel question in terms
of "critical stages." If a certain level of the criminal process was
found to be a "critical stage," then the constitutional right to counsel
attached. Thus, the Supreme Court found that arraignment, 7 plea and
sentencing proceedings, 72 trial,73 lineups,74 and preliminary hearings75
were all "critical stages" that required the presence of counsel. At the
same time, the Court in Escobedo v. Illinois76 and Miranda v. Arizona,7 7
basing its holdings on the fifth amendment right against self-
incrimination, determined that an accused subjected to a "custodial
interrogation" had a constitutional right to have counsel present. The
assumption was that the accused could not adequately assert and pro-
tect his right against self-incrimination unless counsel was present to
assist him.
In the wake of these developments, many commentators argued
that the channel was clear for recognition of a sixth amendment right
to counsel inside the grand jury roomy.7 They were immediately forced
to explain two other Supreme Court cases which inferred that a
68. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
69. 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
70. Id. at 69. Advocating a right to counsel before grand juries, Professor Steele
made this comment about the Powell Court's statement: "If the Court had followed its
own rhetoric and actually extended the right to counsel to 'every step in the proceedings
against him' this article would not be necessary." Steele, Right to Counsel at the Grand
Jury Stage of Criminal Proceedings, 36 Mo. L. REV. 193, 195 (1971).
71. Hamilton v. Alabama, 368 U.S. 52 (1961).
72. White v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 59 (1963).
73. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
74. United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967).
75. Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1 (1970).
76. 378 U.S. 478 (1964).
77. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
78. See, e.g., Boudin, The Federal Grand Jury, 61 GEO. L. J. 1, 17 (1972); Mesh-
besher, Right to Counsel Before Grand Jury, 41 F.R.D. 189, 193-99 (1966); Steele, supra
note 70, at 203; Note, The Rights of a Witness Before a Grand Jury, 1967 DUKE L.J.
97, 124-25.
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witness had no right to counsel inside the grand jury room-Anonymous
v. Baker and In re Groban.79 Neither case dealt with the question
precisely, however."' In Groban, a witness suspected of arson was called
to testify before the Fire Marshall as provided by Ohio law. He refused
to answer without counsel present and was jailed. Holding five-to-four
that Groban had no right to counsel, the Court said in dicta:
A witness before a grand jury cannot insist, as a matter of constitu-
tional right, on being represented by his counsel, nor can a witness
before other investigative bodies. There is no more reason to allow
the presence of counsel before a Fire Marshal trying in the public
interest to determine the cause of a fire. Obviously in these situa-
tions evidence obtained may possibly lay a witness open to criminal
charges. When such charges are made in a criminal proceeding, he
then may demand the presence of his counsel for his defense. Until
then his protection is the privilege against self-incrimination.1
Similarly, Baker involved attorneys who were called as witnesses before
a special judicial investigatory body inquiring into unethical legal
practices. Citing Groban as controlling, the Court in another five-to-
four decision refused to allow counsel to accompany the witnesses
before the investigatory body.82
Besides not dealing specifically with the question of counsel before
a grand jury, it appeared to the commentators that Groban and Baker
were outdated. Groban and Baker both reasoned that the witness could
rely on his fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination. The
commentators asserted that Miranda had recognized the fragility of
the fifth amendment and the often real need for counsel to be present
to help a witness preserve his rights.8 3 Indeed, such a proposition was
recently approved by the Supreme Court:
The assertion of a testimonial privilege, as of many other rights,
often depends upon legal advice from someone who is trained and
skilled in the subject matter, and who may offer a more objective
79. Anonymous v. Baker, 360 U.S. 287 (1959); In re Groban, 352 U.S. 330 (1957).
80. As Justice Brennan stated in his concurring opinion in United States v. Mandujano,
425 U.S. 564, 603 (1976), "neither Groban nor any other case in this Court has squarely
presented the question" of whether "there is any constitutional right of a witness to be
represented by counsel when testifying before a grand jury." (footnote omitted).
81. 352 U.S. at 333 (footnotes omitted).
82. 360 U.S. at 295.
83. See, e.g., GRAND JURY DEFENSE OFFICE OF THE NATIONAL LAWYERS GUILD,
REPRESENTATION OF WITNESSES BEFORE FEDERAL GRAND JURIES 147 (1976) [hereinafter
cited as FEDERAL GRAND JURIES].
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opinion. A layman may not be aware of the precise scope, the
nuances, and boundaries of his Fifth Amendment privilege.8 4
Secondly, the commentators argued that grand jury proceedings
had become a "critical stage."' a They reckoned that the grand jury
was no longer the independent and impartial body that it had been
in England. Rather, they asserted, the modern grand jury had become
just another tool of the prosecutor. The grand jury was likened to a
"rubber stamp" which gave formal approval to the charges sought by
the prosecutor."" It is not surprising that the critics viewed the grand
jury as a "critical stage," for a grand jury appearance by a witness can
be very damning. The grand jury witness, it was argued, needs the
legal expertise of counsel to recognize his rights and privileges.8 7
The sixth amendment argument that the grand jury proceeding
was a "critical stage" met a quick and certain demise at the hands of
the Supreme Court. In Kirby v. Illinois,s a case involving a pre-
indictment lineup, the Court read the words "criminal prosecution"
in the sixth amendment literally. The Court concluded that there
was no sixth amendment right to counsel until "at or after the time
that adversary judicial proceedings have been initiated."8' 9 Although
84. Maness v. Meyers, 419 U.S. 449, 466 (1975) (footnote omitted).
85. See, e.g., Steele, supra note 70; Meshbesher, supra note 78.
86. [The grand jury's] decision to indict or not is usually a rubber stamp of what
the prosecutor has already determined ....
It has been suggested that the grand jury has outlived any usefulness it might
have had and should be abandoned completely, leaving the sole determination of
a criminal charge up to the prosecutor who can act more efficiently and with more
judicial restraint. Whatever its merits, attorneys are faced with the fact that the
grand jury system is operating today and it appears that few, if any, present
practitioners will see its disappearance.
Meshbesher, supra note 78, at 189 (footnotes omitted). See text accompanying notes
30-50 supra.
87. See generally FEDERAL GRAND JURIES, supra note 83, at 145-46.
88. 406 U.S. 682 (1972).
89. Id. at 688. Kirby's narrow holding was that prior to the initiation of "adversary
judicial proceedings," a person subjected to a pre-indictment lineup for identification
purposes had no right to appointed counsel under the sixth amendment. There was no
indication from the Court that Kirby's counsel would have been denied access to the
lineup if he had been privately retained. Arguably, then, a person who can afford
counsel is not to be denied it simply because the proceeding in which he is involved
does not reach the Kirby threshold. For example, a person called to testify before a
legislative hearing may be accompanied by his private counsel, even though the hearing
is not an "adversary judicial proceeding." It should be noted that a procedure allowing
witnesses before a grand jury to be accompanied by counsel only if they could afford it
would likely be challenged on equal protection grounds. The inquiry then would be
whether the right to counsel before a grand jury was so fundamental that to base it
on the ability to pay would be a denial of equal protection.
Consider also the recent case of Brewer v. Williams, 97 S. Ct. 1232 (1977), which
held that the defendant's right to counsel attached after arraignment-a procedure under
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there is still some debate as to what constitutes an "adversary judicial
proceeding," it seems fairly certain that a grand jury proceeding does
not fall within the classification.
The Miranda fifth amendment argument that counsel is presumed
necessary to protect against involuntary self-incrimination is especially
relevant when the person being called to testify before the grand jury
is a "target" or "putative" defendant. A "target" defendant is "a
person who is not an ordinary witness but rather is a prime suspect
of the crime being investigated."90 Since the "target" defendant is likely
to be indicted by the grand jury, it would seem logical that his rights
should be closely protected. Numerous issues arise, including the
"target" defendant's right to counsel before the grand jury,9' and
whether he is entitled to Miranda warnings before he testifies.
The answers to these questions came from the Supreme Court in
1976 in United States v. Manduano.92 The case held that the fifth
amendment did not require the suppression of statements made
before a grand jury by a "target" defendant who had not been given
Miranda warnings. However, a plurality of the Court also dealt with
the right to counsel before a grand jury. It said:
[Mandujano] was also informed that if he desired he could have
Iowa law which is very similar to Florida's "first appearance." Arguably, then, the sixth
amendment right to counsel in Florida attaches at first appearance. Therefore, at any
interrogation following first appearance-including questioning before a grand jury-the
defendant would have a right to have counsel present. Note that in the cases denying
grand jury counsel, the witness had not yet been placed under arrest.
90. Note, Juries and Jurors: The Right to Counsel in the Oklahoma Grand Jury,
29 OKLA. L. REV. 967, 972 (1976) (footnote omitted).
91. In defining what it meant by the words "critical stage," the Escobedo Court said
that it could be when "the investigation is no longer a general inquiry into an unsolved
crime but has begun to focus on a particular suspect. Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S.
478, 490 (1964).
92. 425 U.S. 564 (1976), rev'g 496 F.2d 1050 (5th Cir. 1974). The Court's Mandujano
holding has been further strengthened by two recent cases, United States v. Wong, 97
S. Ct. 1823 (1977), and United States v. Washington, 97 S. Ct. 1814 (1977). In Wong,
the defendant, a Chinese immigrant with a limited knowledge of English, was convicted
of perjury for false statements made before a grand jury. She argued that she had
not understood the prosecutor's warning that she had the right to remain silent. The
Court rejected her argument, holding that the defendant was not entitled to have
false statements suppressed on the ground that the self-incrimination warnings had not
been effective. The fifth amendment, said the Court, does not condone perjury.
In Washington, unlike Mandujano and Wong, the defendant was convicted of the
substantive crime about which he voluntarily testified before a grand jury. He was
given a series of warnings, including notice of his right to remain silent, but he was not
informed that he was a potential defendant. The Court held that the defendant's
grand jury testimony was admissible at trial. The Court reserved judgment on whether
the warnings given were constitutionally required, holding that in this situation, the
warnings actually given dissipated any element of compulsion.
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the assistance of counsel, but that counsel could not be inside the
grand jury room. That statement was plainly a correct recital of
the law. No criminal proceedings had been instituted against re-
spondent, hence the Sixth Amendment right to counsel had not
come into play. Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682 (1972). A witness
'before a grand jury cannot insist, as a matter of constitutional
right, on being represented by his counsel ... .' In re Groban, supra
at 333. Under settled principles the witness may not insist upon
the presence of his attorney in the grand jury room. Fed. Rule
Crim. Proc. 6(d).93
Thus, the plurality was unwilling to provide for counsel before a
grand jury, even when the witness was a "target" defendant.
Justice Brennan disagreed with the plurality on the issue of
counsel before the grand jury. He felt that "the privilege against com-
pulsory self-incrimination is inextricably involved in this case since
a putative defendant is called and interrogated before a grand jury.' '9 4
He discredited the plurality's reliance on Groban, saying that Miranda
and Escobedo, which recognize the " 'coextensive[ness]' . . . of the right
to counsel and the privilege against compulsory self-incrimination, ...
have led many to question the continuing vitality of such older
dicta."95 Justice Brennan also dissented from the "implication in the
plurality opinion" that the right to have counsel outside the grand
jury room was not a constitutional right, and therefore could only
be enjoyed by those able to afford a lawyer.9" Justices Stewart and
93. Id. at 581 (footnote omitted) (Burger, White, Powell, and Rehnquist, JJ.). The
fifth amendment argument for providing counsel at grand juries is based on the Miranda
assumption that a witness cannot protect his right against self-incrimination without
the assistance of counsel. This fifth amendment approach needs to be viewed in light
of the developing law on grants of immunity.
In Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441 (1972), the Supreme Court held that a
"use and derivative use" immunity standard is coextensive with the fifth amendment.
Under the Miranda rationale, counsel is needed to protect his client's fifth amendment
rights. If, however, the witness were granted immunity, his fifth amendment rights
would no longer need protection. In other words, since the immunity grant is coextensive
with the fifth amendment, it supplants the witness' fifth amendment rights. Theoretically,
at least, the witness no longer has self-incrimination problems. Therefore, once immunity
is granted, the rationale for supplying counsel to protect fifth amendment rights would
disappear. At least one state has adopted such an approach by statute. See note 123
and accompanying text infra.
94. 425 U.S. at 602-O3. (Brennan and Marshall, JJ., concurring).
95. Id. at 603 (footnotes and citations omitted).
96. Id. at 608. A key distinction should be noted between a grand jury witness' right
to retain counsel to represent him before a grand jury and that witness' right to counsel
before a grand jury. The former would only allow grand jury counsel for those who
could afford to hire an attorney. The latter would allow counsel for all those called to
testify before a grand jury, even if they were indigent; it could, in effect, be similar to the
sixth amendment right to counsel.
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Blackmun concurred in the result only, finding it unnecessary to
address those issues dealt with by the plurality.
In conclusion, the cases provide very little support under the federal
constitution for allowing counsel to be present with the witness in
the grand jury room.9 7 A plurality of the Court has rejected the notion
that the grand jury proceeding is a critical stage requiring counsel
under the sixth amendment. And in Mandujano, the Court refused to
recognize a right to counsel, even though the witness was a target
defendant and the likelihood of self-incrimination was very real.
Although there is virtually no support for allowing counsel to go
into the grand jury room with the witness, the majority of the federal
and state courts allow the witness to leave the grand jury room and
consult with his attorney after each question.9 Representative of this
position is the view of the Second Circuit Court of Appeals announced
in United States v. Capaldo.99 After holding that Capaldo could not
have his attorney in the grand jury room with him, the court said:
Capaldo was told, however, that he had a right to counsel and that
he would be permitted to consult with counsel immediately outside
the grand jury room whenever he desired. . . .We think that the
rule under which appellant was free to leave the grand jury room
at any time to consult with counsel is a reasonable and workable
accommodation of the traditional investigatory role of the grand
jury, preserved in the Fifth Amendment, and the self-incrimination
and right to counsel provisions of the Fifth and Sixth Amend-
ments.100
There appear to be no federal cases that refuse to allow the witness
to leave the room to consult with his attorney. But one court has
allowed limitations on the frequency of consultation. In In re
Note that in both Groban and Baker, the witnesses already had privately retained
counsel. Their only argument was that this counsel should have been allowed to
accompany them before the investigatory body. See United States v. Mandujano, 425
U.S. 564, 608 (1976) (Brennan, J., concurring).
97. But see Chandler v. Garrison, 286 F. Supp. 191 (E.D. La. 1968) (special cir-
cumstances entitled defendant to counsel before grand jury), af'd, 412 F.2d 857 (5th Cir.
1969); Sheridan v. Garrison, 273 F. Supp. 673 (E.D. La. 1967) (criminal proceedings had
been commenced so defendant had the right to counsel before the grand jury), rev'd on
other grounds, 415 F.2d 699 (5th Cir. 1969).
98. FEDERAL GRAND Juluas, supra note 83, at 144.
99. 402 F.2d 821 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 989 (1969).
100. Id. at 824; accord, United States v. Duncan, 456 F.2d 1401 (9th Cir. 1972);
United States v. George, 444 F.2d 310 (6th Cir. 1971) ; United States v. Weinberg, 439
F.2d 743 (9th Cir. 1971); United States v. Corallo, 413 F.2d 1306 (2d Cir. 1969); United
States v. De Sapio, 299 F. Supp. 436 (S.D.N.Y. 1969); Steele, supra note 68, at 203 and
cases cited therein. See also United States v. Mandujano, 425 U.S. 564, 584 (1976) (Brennan,
J., concurring).
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Tierney,'0 1 the Fifth Circuit approved of a grand jury procedure
whereby the foreman allowed the witness to leave the room "usually
after two and at no time more than three questions had been pro-
pounded. ' ' 10 2 It appears that most courts have not limited the number
of times that a witness can leave the grand jury room to consult with
counsel. 03
Thus our federal courts have developed a strange rule concerning
the right to counsel before grand juries. It is clear that the courts
have not recognized a constitutional right to have counsel present
inside the grand jury room. It is equally settled that the witness may
walk out of the grand jury room and consult his attorney waiting out-
side. The attorney can discover everything that the grand jury asks his
client. The only limitation is that the information has to come to him
secondhand. This cat-and-mouse routine has led one commentator to
note that relegating the lawyer to the hallway "is excessively mechan-
istic, if not altogether absurd.' '0 4
2. Under Florida Law. The grand jury is not widely used in
Florida since the Florida Constitution provides that only capital
crimes need to be charged by grand jury indictments.05 All other
felonies and all misdemeanors may be charged by information. Section
905.17, Florida Statutes, identifies those persons who may be present
during the grand jury session.10 6 The witness' attorney is not spe-
cifically authorized to attend the session; therefore, the statutory con-
struction doctrine of expressio unius est exclusio alterius would pre-
clude his presence. 0 7
101. 465 F.2d 806 (5th Cir. 1972).
102. Id. at 810.
103. See FEDERAL GRAND JuRiEs, supra note 83, at 149. See also cases cited at note 100
supra.
104. Steele, supra note 70, at 203.
105. FLA. CONST. art. I, § 15(a).
106. FLA, STAT. § 905.17 (1975) provides:
(1) No person shall be present at the sessions of the grand jury except the
witness under examination, the state attorney and his assistant state attorneys,
designated assistants as provided for in s. 27.18, the court reporter or steno-
grapher, and the interpreter. The stenographic records, notes, and transcriptions
made by the court reporter or stenographer shall be filed with the clerk who shall
keep them in a sealed container not subject to public inspection. The notes,
records, and transcriptions shall be released by the clerk only on request by a
grand jury for use by the grand jury or on order of the court pursuant to, Sec.
905.27.
(2) No person shall be present while the grand jurors are deliberating or
voting.
(3) An intentional violation of the provisions of this section shall constitute
indirect criminal contempt of court.
107. It is, of course, a general principal of statutory construction that the mention
of one thing implies the exclusion of another; expressio unius est exclusio alterius.
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Probably because the grand jury is used infrequently in the Florida
criminal process, there is little case law dealing with a witness' right to
counsel before a State grand jury. No cases were found dealing with
the issue under the right to counsel provision in the Florida Constitu-
tion.'018 The most recent Florida case dealing with the right to counsel
before a grand jury is a 1968 case, Martin v. State.109 In Martin, the
witness had been called before the grand jury and given transactional
immunity. Nevertheless, he refused to testify and was jailed. On
appeal, Martin contended that he should have been allowed to step
outside the grand jury room and consult with his counsel. Disagreeing
with this contention, the court said:
[Martin] says: "We do not mean to imply that he has the right to
have his counsel present in the Grand Jury room; nevertheless, the
accepted practice is to permit the witness to consult with his attorney
who may be present outside the Grand Jury room." He argues that
the witness must be afforded an opportunity to "step outside the
grand jury room for such consultations" whenever he chooses.
There is respected authority for the proposition that such is
not yet the practice in Florida. See State ex rel. Lowe v. Nelson,
Fla. App. 1967, 202 So. 2d 232.
It takes but little imagination to realize that when such pro-
cedure does become the "accepted practice" grand jury investiga-
tions will be impeded and hindered to the point that they will be
reduced to a mockery and an object of ridicule."-
Thus at least one Florida court has declined to follow the majority
rule, let alone expand it to allow counsel in the grand jury room.
The court in Martin relied on a First District Court of Appeal
case, State ex rel. Lowe v. Nelson."' In that case, the court held that
a witness called before a grand jury was entitled to the warnings or
protections of Miranda. Lowe in turn relied on Gordon v. Gerstein,
1 2
a 1966 Florida Supreme Court case. Gordon involved a witness, sub-
poenaed to testify before the state attorney under section 27.04, Florida
Statutes," 3 who refused to testify when he was not allowed to have
Hence, where a statute enumerates the things on which it is to operate, or forbids
certain things, it is ordinarily to be construed as excluding from its operation all
those not expressly mentioned.
Thayer v. State, 335 So. 2d 815, 817 (Fla. 1976) (citation omitted).
108. FLA. CONST. art. I, § 16.
109. 208 So. 2d 630 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 214 So. 2d 623 (Fla. 1968).
110. Id. at 632-33.
111. 202 So. 2d 232 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1967).
112. 189 So. 2d 873 (Fla. 1966).
113. FLA. STAT. § 27.04 (1975) provides:
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his counsel present. The Gordon court recognized that this was not
the same as a grand jury, but reasoned by analogy to the grand jury.
It declined to follow Mr. Justice Black's dissent in Anonymous v.
Baker,"4 and opted instead for the view that counsel need not be
furnished for a witness before a grand jury. 15
The lack of Florida case law on the issue of grand jury counsel is
probably attributable to two reasons. First, Florida grand juries
probably do not call many "target" defendants to testify because of
Florida's broad transactional immunity statute; state attorneys want to
avoid the possibility of inadvertent grants of immunity." 6 Most of
the witnesses before the grand jury are police and others unconcerned
with having counsel present. Second, it is likely that notwithstanding
the Martin case, Florida grand juries as a matter of practice allow
witnesses to leave and consult an attorney at their request."' If
The state attorney shall have summoned all witnesses required on behalf of the
state; and he is allowed the process of his court to summon witnesses from
throughout the state to appear before him in or out of term time at such
convenient places in the state attorney's judicial circuit and at such convenient
times as may be designated in the summons, to testify before him as to any
violation of the criminal law upon which they may be interrogated, and he is
empowered to administer oaths to all witnesses summoned to testify by the
process of his court or who may voluntarily appear before him to testify as to
any violation or violations of the criminal law.
114. 360 U.S. 287 (1959).
115. Justice Thomas stated for the court:
What a spectacle would evolve if all the witnesses before all the grand juries and
all the prosecutors in the State could plant their feet and defy inquisition into
criminal violations unless each had an attorney at his elbow. That would indeed
be a leap from the sublime protection under the Constitution to the ridiculous
obstruction of justice. We don't view the administration of justice as a means
only of coddling prisoners and securing to lawbreakers escape from paying for
their misdeeds but rather as a system to winnow the guilty and innocent to make
freedom as well as guilt more sure.
189 So. 2d at 875. Admittedly, the Gordon decision was delivered before Miranda. Sixteen
days after Miranda, the court denied a petition for rehearing. Id. at 876. See also note
96 supra.
116. Interview with State Attorney Harry Morrison, January 6, 1978. Mr. Morrison
indicated that the state rarely, if ever, called a putative defendant to testify before the
grand jury unless that person agreed to waive his immunity.
117. Consider, for example, the excerpt of the Hillsborough County Grand Jury pro-
ceedings contained in Tsavaris v. Scruggs, No. 48,637 (Fla. Mar. 17, 1977). State Attorney
Salcines, in advising the witness Tsavaris of his rights before the grand jury, stated:
Mr. Salcines: This is Dr. Louis Tsavaris, who has been subpoenaed to appear
before you . . . . [H]is attorney, Mr. Larry Byrd, ... is standing right outside
the door.
Doctor, should you, at any time, wish to consult with your attorney you may
do that.
Q. And [do you understand] that you have a right to be represented by an
attorney, and to have him present outside of the Grand Jury Room to confer
1977]
850 FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol.5:829
witnesses were denied this right as in Martin, it seems certain that
some would have appealed.
Perhaps Martin is distinguishable from most right to counsel before
grand jury cases because in that case, the witness had already been
granted immunity. At least one authority has pointed out many
reasons why a witness needs to be able to consult with counsel, even
after immunity is granted.""
3. Various State Options and the ABA Proposal. Of the fifty states,
forty follow the majority rule and refuse to allow a witness before a
grand jury to have counsel present with him. 19 The ten states that
allow the witness to have counsel with him in the grand jury room are
Arizona, Illinois, Kansas, Michigan, Minnesota, Oklahoma, South
Dakota, Utah, Virginia, and Washington.120 They provide for this
right by statute or by a rule of criminal procedure. No state provides
for counsel before a grand jury by constitutional provision.
There is a great deal of variance among the ten state provisions
which allow a grand jury witness to be accompanied by counsel.
Virginia, for example, allows the witness to have counsel present in a
special session of the grand jury, but not a regular one. 2 , Oklahoma,12
Michigan1 23 Utah,"24 and South Dakota1 5 provide that any witness
called to testify before a grand jury may have an attorney accompany
him. Arizona" 6 and Illinois '1 7 on the other hand, allow counsel to be
with before you answer any questions put to you ... ?
Q. Any question that is asked that you wish to consult with your attorney,
the interrogation would stop immediately, and we will give you a reasonable time
to consult with your attorney. Do you understand that, Doctor?
1-18. See note 83 supra.
119. Report to the ABA House of Delegates, Section of Criminal Justice, Recom-
mendation Number 1, approved August 9, 1977, at 6. Actually, the report listed nine
states that permitted counsel. The Utah provision brings the total to ten. UTAH CODE
ANN. § 77-19-3 (Supp. 1974).
120. Report, supra note 119.
121. VA. CODE § 19.2-209 (1975). In Virginia, special grand juries may only "in-
vestigate and make report thereon concerning any condition which tends to promote
criminal activity in the community or which indicates misfeasance of governmental
authority by government agencies or the officials thereof." Id. § 19.2-191(2). Regular
grand juries can do likewise and may also consider bills of indictment prepared by the
state attorney. Id. § 19.2-191.
122. OKLA. STAT. tit. 22, § 340 (Supp. 1976). Oklahoma allows only "one (1) attorney
representing [the] witness." Id.
123. MICH. CoMP. LAws ANN. § 767.3 (1975).
124'. UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-19-3 (Supp. 1974). The Utah statute limits the evidence
receivable by the grand jury to "none but legal evidence." Id.
125. S.D. CoMPILED LAws ANN. § 23-30-7 (Supp. 1976).
126. ARiZ. R. CR15M. P. 12.6 (1970).
127. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 112-4(b) (Smith-Hurd) (Supp. 1977).
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present only if the witness is under investigation by the grand jury-
i.e., a target defendant. Washington's statute12 allows counsel to
accompany a witness before a grand jury if the witness has not been
granted immunity. The Minnesota statute" 9 allows a witness to have
counsel present only after he has waived his immunity from self-
incrimination. Kansas'2 0 provides the broadest protection for the
witness. It clearly states that all witnesses before a grand jury have a
right to counsel and must be so informed. It also states that if a witness
is indigent, counsel must be provided by the state. In each state that
allows a witness to have counsel before the grand jury, the role of the
attorney is restricted.lsl
At its annual meeting this past August, the American Bar Associa-
tion House of Delegates adopted twenty-five out of twenty-seven pro-
posals for grand jury reform.132 One of the proposals adopted dealt
with a witness' right to counsel before a grand jury. The proposal
suggests that a witness appearing before a grand jury "shall have the
right to be accompanied by counsel in his or her appearance before
the grand jury.'' 13 3 Like the state provisions listed above, the ABA
proposal contemplates the attorney's role before the grand jury as
that of passive advisor to the witness. He may not address the grand
jurors or ask questions, and he may be removed from the room for
"conduct inconsistent with this principle.' ' 114 Dubbing the resolution
"The Lawyers Relief Act," Attorney General Griffin Bell opposed the
change.' 35 Nevertheless, the proposal passed 186-93.13
4. Conclusions.
128. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 10.27.120 (Supp. 1976).
129. MINN. R. CraM. P. 18.04 (1964).
130. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-3009 (1974).
131. A common restriction is the limitation of the attorney's role to merely giving
advice to his client; he is not allowed to ask questions or to cross-examine. See, e.g.,
ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 112-4(b).
132. ABA Annual Meeting, 46 U.S.L.W. 2089 (August 23, 1977); Report to the ABA
House of Delegates, Section of Criminal Justice, Recommendation Number 1, approved
August 9, 1977.
133. Report to the ABA House of Delegates, Section of Criminal Justice, Recom-
mendation Number 1, approved August 9, 1977.
It is interesting to note that the ABA Criminal Justice Section report on its grand
jury proposal does not mention providing counsel for indigent witnesses before the
grand jury. Under the Kirby rationale, counsel for indigent witnesses before a grand
jury would not appear to be mandated by the sixth amendment. However, counsel
for indigents would probably be mandated by the equal protection clause. See note 89
supra.
134. Report to the ABA House of Delegates, Section of Criminal Justice, Recom-
mendation Number 1, approved August 9, 1977.
135. 45 U.S.L.W. 2089 (August 23, 1977).
136. Id. at 2090.
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No doubt it would be a boon to prosecutors if they could summon
before a Grand Jury a person against whom an indictment is being
sought and there interrogate him, isolated from the protection of
counsel and presiding judge and insulated from the critical ob-
servation of the public. But there is a serious question whether
our jurisprudence, fortified by constitutional declaration, permits
that procedure.137
Despite powerful statements like the one above, the vast majority
of courts have refused to allow a witness before a grand jury to be
represented by counsel in the grand jury room. As with other cases
that have upheld the sanctity of the grand jury,1m it appears that the
courts' reluctance to extend the right of counsel to grand juries is
largely based on the historical secrecy of the institution. Professor
Steele has written:
We have reached a phase where we grant a suspect right to counsel
if he is placed in a line-up or interrogated by a police department,
but we deny a suspect counsel if he is paraded before, or interrogated
by, a grand jury. The justification for that apparent incongruity is
historical precedent. And yet, most of the grand jury's historical
function has withered from disuse. Given the cadre of trained
police available today, there is practically no need for investigation
by a grand jury.13 9
One argument often raised by proponents of the majority rule is
that the presence of an attorney for the witness would turn the grand
jury into an adversary proceeding and cause delay. Concerning delay,
it is hard to imagine a more dilatory procedure than the present method
of allowing the witness to leave the room after each question to consult
with his attorney. A carefully drawn provision allowing the attorney
to take the role of a passive advisor would almost certainly speed up
the grand jury process. Of course, if the attorney were allowed into
the grand jury room, he could hear every question asked of the
witness. But under the present majority rule, he still can hear every
question since the witness is allowed to leave the room to consult him.
If the witness' lawyer is not allowed to do anything but advise, it is
difficult to see how the proceeding could be viewed as adversarial. If
the attorney overstepped these reasonable restrictions, he could be
barred from the room. One commentator has noted that: "Presence
137. Powell v. United States, 226 F.2d 269, 274 (D.C. Cir. 1955) (footnote omitted).
138. See, e.g., United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 538 (1974); Branzburg v. Hayes,
408 U.S. 665 (1972); Costello v. United States, 350 U.S. 359 (1956).
139. Steele, supra note 70, at 214. See generally note 86 supra.
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of a lawyer at a hearing does not necessarily turn it into a contentious
or adversary proceeding, anymore than presence of a physician at an
execution turns it into a medical treatment. ' '
140
B. Use and Transactional Immunity
1. Immunity and the Federal Constitution. One obvious problem
with the privilege against self-incrimination is that it hampers the
detection of crime. A witness could assert the privilege, remain silent,
and thus thwart the investigative process. Not surprisingly, England
and the United States began to develop ways to avoid this impact of
the privilege. The primary method chosen was the grant of immunity.
The idea behind the immunity statutes was simple: a reluctant witness
would be compelled to testify, and, in return, the state would grant
him some degree of immunity from prosecution for the crime about
which he testified.
Immunity statutes generally fall into one of three categories. Under
a "use" immunity statute, only the subsequent use of the witness'
compelled testimony is prohibited.141 "Use and derivative use" im-
munity statutes prohibit the subsequent use of the witness' compelled
testimony as well as any evidentiary "fruits" that were derived from
that testimony. 14 2 "Transactional" immunity statutes prohibit the prose-
cution of the witness for any crime about which he was compelled to
testify.1'4  Use immunity is the narrowest protection for the witness, for
140. Steele, supra note 70, at 204.
141. An example of a use immunity statute is ch. 11, 12 Stat. 333 (1862):
[T]he testimony of a witness examined and testifying before either House of
Congress . . . shall not be used as evidence in any criminal proceeding against
such witness in any court of justice: Provided, however, [tihat no official paper
or record, produced by such witness on such examination, shall be held or taken
to be included within the privilege of said evidence so to protect such witness
from any criminal proceeding as aforesaid ....
This act was passed in an attempt to uncover corruption then existing in the Congress.
Interestingly, the original immunity law passed for the same purpose in 1857 was a
broader transactional immunity statute. It was narrowed to the use immunity statute
above in 1862 by members of Congress who were "[r]ecoiling from the immunity 'baths'
that enabled corrupt rascals to escape from criminal liability .... . L. LEVY, AGAINST
THE LAW: THE NIXON COURT AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE 174-75 (1974).
142. The current federal immunity statute, 18 U.S.C. § 6002 (1970), is representative:
Whenever a witness refuses, on the basis of his privilege against self-incrimination,
to testify . . . and the person presiding over the proceeding communicates to the
witness an order issued under this part, the witness may not refuse to comply ...
but no testimony or other information compelled under the order (or any in-
formation directly or indirectly derived from such testimony or other information)
may be used against the witness in a criminal case, except a prosecution for
perjury, giving a false statement, or otherwise failing to comply with the order.
143. An example of a transactional immunity statute is ch, 83, 27 Stat. 443 (1893),
which provides in relevant part:
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it only prohibits the use of his actual testimony in a subsequent prose-
cution. Transactional immunity is the broadest. The current federal
immunity statute is the use and derivative use type.14 Presently,
Florida's immunity statute grants the broader transactional immunity.'4 5
For over eighty years, the United States Supreme Court has
struggled with which form of immunity (if any) meets the constitu-
tional requirements of the fifth amendment. In 1892, the Court in
Counselman v. Hitchcock'46 unanimously struck down a federal statute
which compelled testimony before the ICC in exchange for use
immunity only.' 47 The Court said that the statute in question was not
co-extensive with the protections of the fifth amendment. Using very
broad language, the Court concluded:
We are clearly of [the] opinion that no statute which leaves the
party or witness subject to prosecution after he answers the criminat-
ing question put to him, can have the effect of supplanting the
privilege conferred by the Constitution of the United States. Section
860 of the Revised Statutes does not supply a complete protection
from all the perils against which the constitutional prohibition was
designed to guard, and is not a full substitute for that prohibition.
In view of the constitutional provision, a statutory enactment, to be
valid, must afford absolute immunity against future prosecution for
the offence to which the question relates.'48
The Court's language clearly indicated that the only type of immunity
that it would consider consonant with the fifth amendment was trans-
actional immunity.
[N]o person shall be excused from attending and testifying . . . for the reason
that the testimony or evidence, documentary or otherwise, required of him may
tend to criminate him or subject him to a penalty or forfeiture. But no person
shall be prosecuted or subjected to any penalty or forfeiture for or on account of
any transaction, matter or thing, concerning which he may testify ....
144. 18 U.S.C. § 6002 (1970).
145. FLA. STAT. § 914.04 (1975) provides in relevant part:
No person, having been duly served with a subpoena or subpoena duces tecum,
shall be excused from attending and testifying . . . upon the ground or for the
reason that the testimony or evidence . . . required of him may tend to convict
him of a crime or to subject him to a penalty or forfeiture, but no person shall
be prosecuted or subjected to any penalty or forfeiture for or on account of any
transaction, matter, or thing concerning which he may so testify or produce evidence,
documentary or otherwise, and no testimony so given or produced shall be received
against him upon any criminal investigation or proceeding.
146. 142 U.S. 547 (1892).
147. The statute, ch. 13, 15 Stat. 37 (1868), provided in part:
[N]o answer or other pleading of any party, and no discovery or evidence ob-
tained by means of any judicial proceeding from any party or witness . . . shall
be given in evidence, or in any manner used against such party or witness . ...
148. 142 U.S. at 585-86 (emphasis added).
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A few days after the Counselman decision, Congress replaced the
invalidated law with one granting transactional immunity.149 This
statute was challenged four years later in Brown v. Walker.115 In a five-
to-four decision, the Court upheld the new immunity statute. The
Court read the Counselman language as saying that complete trans-
actional immunity would be a substitute for the fifth amendment pro-
tection. The fifth amendment's purpose, said the Court, was to protect
a witness compelled to give testimony from future criminal prosecu-
tion as a result of his statements. 51 The statute in question served
this purpose.
The Brown dissenters took an absolutist position, which is exempli-
fied by the first paragraph of Justice Shiras' dissent:
It is too obvious to require argument that, when the people of
the United States, in the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution,
declared that no person should be compelled in any criminal case
to be a witness against himself, it was their intention, not merely
that every person should have such immunity, but that his right
thereto should not be divested or impaired by any act of Congress.15 2
The dissenters were of the opinion that no immunity grant could
substitute for the protections of the fifth amendment. They also argued
that the fifth amendment was supposed to protect one against public
infamy in addition to self-incrimination. Since Brown, the absolutist
argument has been raised periodically, but it has never commanded a
majority of the Court. 53
The Supreme Court reaffirmed Brown in Ullman v. United States.54
Ullman was subpoenaed to testify about Communist Party activities.
When he refused to testify, he was granted transactional immunity
under the Immunity Act of 1954.55 Ullman argued that his testimony
would cause him to suffer great losses such as his job, labor union
membership, and passport eligibility, and would cause him "general
public opprobrium."'15  The Court rejected his argument:
The interdiction of the Fifth Amendment operates only where a
witness is asked to incriminate himself-in other words, to give testi-
149. Ch. 83, 27 Stat. 443 (1893). See note 143 supra.
150. 161 U.S. 591 (1896).
151. Id. at 605-06.
152. Id. at 610.
153. See, e.g., Ullman v. United States, 350 U.S. 422 (1956) (Douglas & Black, J.J.,
dissenting).
154. 350 U.S. 422 (1956).
155. Ch. 769, § 1, 68 Stat. 745 (1954), repealed by 18 U.S.C. § 6002 (1970).
156. 350 U.S. at 430.
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mony which may possibly expose him to a criminal charge. But if
the criminality has already been taken away, the Amendment ceases
to apply. 157
Justice Frankfurter, for the Ullman Court, concluded:
[T]he Court's holding in Brown v. Walker has never been challenged;
the case and the doctrine it announced have consistently and without
question been treated as definitive by this Court, in opinions written,
among others, by Holmes and Brandeis, JJ. . . . The 1893 statute
has become part of our constitutional fabric and has been included
"in substantially the same terms, in virtually all of the major regula-
tory enactments of the Federal Government.' 158
The Court's language in Ullman was clear; transactional immunity
was still the relevant constitutional standard.
Although transactional immunity was the accepted constitutional
standard, there still existed the problem of inter-jurisdictional im-
munity. The petitioners in Brown, Ullman, and other cases argued
that although the sovereign asking the questions had granted them full
immunity, they might still be subject to prosecution on the basis of
their statements in another jurisdiction which had not granted them
immunity. This argument was especially valid after the Court, in
United States v. Murdock,159 initiated the "two-sovereignties" rule.
This rule stated that a person could not refuse to testify on the grounds
that his testimony would subject him to prosecution by another
sovereign. In Ullman, the Court held that Congress could grant federal
and state immunity since the immunity statute in question dealt with
national security. 60 But in most other situations, witnesses were caught
in this inter-jurisdictional dilemma.
In Murphy v. Waterfront Commission of New York Harbor,16: the
Court sought to solve this pressing problem. The petitioners had been
subpoenaed to testify about a work stoppage at the New Jersey piers.
New Jersey and New York granted them full immunity. Nevertheless,
they still refused to answer, asserting that they might subject themselves
to federal prosecution. The Court concluded, after lengthy review, that
there had been no historical basis for the "two sovereignties" rule. It
rejected Murdock and held "that the constitutional privilege against
self-incrimination protects a state witness against incrimination under
157. 350 U.S. at 431, quoting Hale v. Hinkle, 201 U.S. 43, 67 (1906).
158. Id. at 437-38 (citations omitted).
159. 284 U.S. 141 (1931).
160. 350 U.S. at 436.
161. 378 U.S. 52 (1964).
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federal as well as state law and a federal witness against incrimination
under state as well as federal law." 10 2 However, the Court went on to
state that the proper standard for inter-jurisdictional immunity was
use and derivative use immunity, not transactional immunity. It con-
cluded that "a state witness may not be compelled to give testimony
which may be incriminating under federal law unless the compelled
testimony and its fruits cannot be used in any manner by federal
officials in connection with a criminal prosecution against him."'163
At least one commentator, speaking of the Murphy decision, has
said that although it was an exception to the rule in Brown and
Counselman, it was "meant to be an extension of the Fifth Amend-
ment."'164 Nevertheless, Murphy marked the first time that the Supreme
Court had accepted something less than transactional immunity.16 5
Only one year later, the Court in Albertson v. Subversive Activities
Control Board1 6 invalidated a statute which granted the witness only
use immunity for his testimony. Citing Counselman, the Court held
that the offered immunity must be absolute for the entire transaction.
Apparently convinced that the inter-jurisdictional immunity cases were
of a completely different genre, the Court did not even mention
Murphy in its opinion. Therefore, it seems clear that even after
Murphy, the Court felt that complete transactional immunity was
still the proper constitutional standard. This standard stood un-
questioned until 1970.
In 1970, the Nixon Administration proposed substantial legislation
in the crime control area. The result was the Organized Crime Control
Act of 1970, Title II of which is the current federal immunity
statute. 167 In the seventy-eight years between the Counselman decision
and the enactment of the present federal immunity statute, Congress
had enacted some seventy immunity provisions. 6 With a few excep-
tions, none of these provided for anything less than transactional im-
munity. Title II of the 1970 Act replaced virtually all of these with
use and derivative use immunity. 16
9
162. Id. at 77-78.
163. Id. at 79 (emphasis added).
164. LEVY, supra note 141, at 177.
165. See generally Note, The Scope of Testimonial Immunity Under the Fifth
Amendment: Kastigar v. United States, 6 Loy. L.A.L. REV. 350 (1973) [hereinafter cited
as Scope of Testimonial Immunity].
166. 382 U.S. 70 (1965).
167. 18 U.S.C. § 6002 (1970). See note 142 supra.
168. Note, Scope of Testimonial Immunity, supra note 165, at 364.
169. See note 142 supra. Prior to the 1970 Act, most of the federal investigatory bodies
had their own similar, but separate, immunity provisions. The 1970 Act repealed all
of the separate provisions and consolidated them into 18 U.S.C. § 6002 (1970).
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The current federal immunity statute was challenged and upheld
in Kastigar v. United States.1-° Speaking for the Court, Mr. Justice
Powell said that use and derivative use immunity was consonant with
the guarantees of the fifth amendment privilege. He continued:
Transactional immunity, which accords full immunity from prosecu-
tion for the offense to which the compelled testimony relates, affords
the witness considerably broader protection than does the Fifth
Amendment privilege. The privilege has never been construed to
mean that one who invokes it cannot subsequently be prosecuted.171
The Court next attempted to distinguish the prior case law.17 2
The Court pointed out that the immunity statutes that were struck
down in Counselman and Albertson were only use immunity statutes,
and that this was the first time the Court had considered a use and
derivative use statute. The Court dismissed the broad language of
Counselman, saying that it was "unnecessary to the Court's decision,
and cannot be considered binding authority."1' 3
The majority latched onto the Murphy case, citing it as a precedent
approving use and derivative use statutes. The Court realized that
here, unlike Murphy, the jurisdiction seeking to compel the testimony
had granted only use and derivative use immunity. It concluded, how-
ever, that if this kind of immunity could supplant the fifth amendment
for purposes of the noncompelling jurisdiction, then nothing in the
fifth amendment causes the compelling jurisdiction to be held to any
higher standard.
[B]oth the reasoning of the Court in Murphy and the result
reached compel the conclusion that use and derivative-use immunity
is constitutionally sufficient to compel testimony over a claim of the
privilege. Since the privilege is fully applicable and its scope is the
same whether invoked in a state or federal jurisdiction, the Murphy
conclusion that a prohibition on use and derivative use secures a
witness' Fifth Amendment privilege against infringement by the
Federal Government demonstrates that immunity from use and
derivative use is coextensive with the scope of the privilege .... This
protection coextensive with the privilege is the degree of protection
that the Constitution requires, and is all that the Constitution re-
170. 406 U.S. 441 (1972). See also Zicarelli v. New Jersey Investigation Comm'n, 406
U.S. 472 (1972), upholding a New Jersey statute similar to 18 U.S.C. § 6002 (1970).
171. 406 U.S. at 453.
172. Justice Powell's treatment of the strong precedents in favor of transactional
immunity has led one commentator to write that "[h]is prestidigitory [sic] manipulation
of the precedents left them twisted like pretzels." L. LEvy, supra note 141, at 184.
173. 406 U.S. at 455.
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quires even against the jurisdiction compelling testimony by grant-
ing immunity.74
Finally, the Court addressed the petitioners' argument that the
statute could not be enforced in practice; it would be impossible,
petitioners said, to prove how certain leads were obtained. The Court
disagreed, holding that the use of investigatory leads obtained from
compelled testimony was banned by the statute. The Court also re-
affirmed the Murphy enforcement standard:
Once a defendant demonstrates that he has testified, under a state
grant of immunity, to matters related to the federal prosecution,
the federal authorities have the burden of showing that their evi-
dence is not tainted by establishing that they had an independent,
legitimate source for the disputed evidence.175
In summary, the Supreme Court has moved from its broad language
in Counselman and Brown favoring transactional immunity to the
use and derivative use standard developed in Kastigar. The new
standard offers substantially less protection to the witness who is com-
pelled to testify against his wishes. Despite a few rumblings from an
occasional dissenter, there appears to be no doubt that immunity statutes
in some form are constitutional. But it seems clear from the Court's
distinction in Kastigar that a grant of immunity offering a witness less
protection than a use and derivative use statute would not meet the
requirements of the fifth amendment.
2. Immunity Under Florida Law. Florida's current immunity
statute provides for transactional immunity.176 The statute, in some
form or another, dates back to 1905.177 Like most state constitutions,
the Florida Constitution does not specifically include a provision con-
cerning immunity for compelled testimony; 7 8 it merely guarantees a
174. 406 U.S. at 458-59 (footnotes omitted).
175. 406 U.S. at 460, quoting Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U.S. at 79 n.18.
The dissents of Justices Douglas and Marshall in Kastigar also express the fear that in-
vestigative leads will be obtained from compelled testimony. Justice Brennan did not
participate in Kastigar, but his dissent in Picirillo v. New York, 400 U.S. 548 (1971) indi-
cates that he held views similar to the Kastigar dissenters. See United States v. Mc-
Daniel, 449 F. 2d 832 (8th Cir. 1971).
176. FLA. STAT. § 914.04 (1975), supra note 145.
177. Act of June 1, 1905, ch. 5400, § 1, 1905 FLA. LAws 78.
178. Only two state constitutions contain immunity guarantees for those who are com-
pelled to testify. The Arizona constitution guarantees transactional immunity for those
witnesses who are compelled to testify about "bribery or illegal rebating":
Bribery or illegal rebating; witnesses; self-incrimination no defense.
Section 19. Any person having knowledge or possession of facts that tend to
establish the guilt of any other person or corporation charged with bribery or
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right against self-incrimination similar to that contained in the fifth
amendment of the United States Constitution. 1 79
The leading case construing Florida's immunity statute is State ex
rel. Hough v. Popper1s° In Hough, certain witnesses were compelled
to testify against a man named Connell. Subsequently, they were in-
dicted along with Connell as co-conspirators. Examining the Florida
statute, the court concluded that it grants both transactional and use
immunity. The statute provides for complete immunity from prosecu-
tion for any other crime which relates to the criminal transaction
about which the witness was compelled to testify. Additionally, if in
the course of his testimony, a witness makes a statement unrelated to
the transaction, but which nevertheless links him to a crime, then he
is granted use immunity for that statement. 181 The Hough case was
illegal rebating, shall not be excused from giving testimony or producing evidence,
when legally called upon to do so, on the ground that it may tend to incriminate
him under the laws of the State; but no person shall be prosecuted or subject
to any penalty or forfeiture for, or on account of, any transaction, matter, or
thing concerning which he may so testify or produce evidence.
Ariz. Const. art. II, § 19.
The Oklahoma constitutional provision is even broader; it guarantees complete trans-
actional immunity to all witnesses who are compelled to testify after they have refused
to testify on the grounds of self-incrimination.
Witnesses not excused from testifying-immunity from prosecution.
Any person having knowledge or possession of facts that tend to establish the
guilt of any other person or corporation charged with an offense against the
laws of the State, shall not be excused from giving testimony or producing
evidence, when legally called upon so to do, on the ground that it may tend to
incriminate him under the laws of the State; but no person shall be prosecuted
or subjected to any penalty or forfeiture for or on account of any transaction,
matter, or thing concerning which he may so testify or produce evidence.
OKLA. CONST. art. II, § 27. The Oklahoma provision is substantially the same as the
Florida immunity statute. See FLA. STAT. § 914.04 (1975), supra note 145.
179. Compare FLA. CONST. art. I, § 9 with U.S. CONST. amend. V.
180. 287 So. 2d 282 (Fla. 1973). See State v. Toogood, 349 So. 2d 1203 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct.
App. 1977).
181. The court offered an example of how the dual immunity provisions might
operate:
Thus, if a person testifies under subpoena before a grand jury concerning an armed
robbery in which he was a participant, and states in the course of his testimony
that he drove his black Cadillac as the "getaway car," and it later is discovered
that this car was driven by the witness in another, unconnected robbery, the statute
provides the witness with complete immunity from prosecution for the robbery
concerning which he testified, but only with use immunity as to the second, un-
connected robbery. For this separate offense, the witness may be prosecuted;
the statute, however, forbids the use of his compelled testimony in this prosecution
even to establish the fact (innocent in and of itself) of ownership of the vehicle.
It is the function of the use immunity in such a situation to provide the immunity
necessary to safeguard the constitutional privilege against self-incrimination as to
separate facts of an independent criminal transaction. The testimony given as
to such incidental facts may not be used against the witness, but he may be prose-
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remanded to the lower court to resolve two issues: 1) whether the testi-
mony of the petitioners related to the criminal transaction for which
they were indicted, thus entitling them to transactional immunity; and
2) if it did not and the petitioners were only entitled to use immunity,
whether the state could prove that it obtained its information from
independent sources. 8 2
Florida has liberally construed its immunity statute to protect a
witness from forfeitures other than criminal penalties. In Lurie v.
Florida State Board of Dentistry8 3 the Court held that where a witness
was granted immunity under the immunity statute, the grant would
also render the witness immune from administrative license revocation
proceedings. In Gilliam v. State,8 4 petitioners argued that while they
had transactional immunity in Florida, they would have only use and
derivative use immunity if they were indicted for similar crimes in an-
other jurisdiction. The court held that they must nevertheless testify,
and recognized that under Kastigar and Ziccarelli, the federal constitu-
tion only requires use and derivative use immunity. The Gilliam court
did not mention the self-incrimination protection under the Florida
Constitution.8 5
Although transactional immunity has long been the accepted rule
in the state, several recent developments in Florida law indicate that
the transactional immunity doctrine in Florida is not as secure as it
might appear. In spring of 1977, the Florida Supreme Court handed
down its decision in Tsavaris v. Scruggs.8 6 Tsavaris, a psychiatrist,
was indicted for the murder of a former patient. The question was
cuted for this independent criminal transaction if it can be proved without
the use of the compelled testimony. This is where the State's contended "in-
dependent source" of proof comes in. Such proof, however, must be of the separate,
independent transaction. As initially stated, there is a complete immunity as to
the transaction for which petitioners were subpoenaed to testify.
287 So. 2d at 284.
182. See State v. Hough, 332 So. 2d 98 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1976) (holding that
the state could not prove that it obtained its information from independent sources).
Although the court uses the term "use immunity," id. at 101, it appears to mean "use and
derivative use immunity."
183. 288 So. 2d 223 (Fla. 1973). The Lurie court overruled Headley v. Baron, 228
So. 2d 281 (Fla. 1969), which had refused to extend the immunity statute to administra-
tive proceedings. Headley, in turn, had overruled Fla. Bd. of Architecture v. Seymour, 62
So. 2d I (Fla. 1952), which had taken the same position as Lurie.
184. 267 So. 2d 658 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1972).
185. FLA. CONST., art. I, § 9.
186. No. 48,637 (Fla. Mar. 17, 1977). Judge Hatchett authored the three-man plurality
opinion. Justice Sundberg concurred in the result only, being of the opinion that the
sole issue before the court was the applicability of the Florida transactional immunity
statute. Dissenting Justices England, Adkins, and Roberts would have granted trans-
actional immunity in this case. They rejected what they viewed as the adoption by the
plurality of the federal fifth amendment case law,
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whether Tsavaris could claim immunity from prosecution for murder
because his secretary, under subpoena, had turned over to the police
his personal appointment book and the medical records of the victim.
A plurality of the court held that even if the records were protected
by the fifth amendment, the immunity statute would not apply.18 7 The
court's remarks about the Florida immunity statute are enlightening:
Immunity statutes are designed to insulate the witness against the in-
criminating effect of testimony the State compels him to give. As
a federal constitutional matter, it is only necessary that the witness
be given use immunity. Zicarelli v. New Jersey State Comm'n of In-
vestigation, 406 U.S. 472 (1972); Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S.
441 (1972). Under Section 914.04, Florida Statutes (1975), the prose-
cutor, by requiring a subpoenaed witness to testify over objection on
self-incrimination grounds, confers transactional immunity as to
other offenses. State ex rel. Hough v. Popper, 287 So. 2d 282,
reh. den. 287 So. 2d 321 (Fla. 1974). Whether, in such circumstances,
this broader grant of immunity is required by Art. I, § 9, Florida
Constitution is an open question.'88
The court must have meant "use and derivative use" instead of "use"
when referring to the federal constitutional standard; even Kastigar
implied that a pure use immunity statute would not meet constitu-
tional requirements.18 9 More importantly, the court declined to
recognize transactional immunity as being required by the Florida
Constitution's self-incrimination clause, specifically reserving that issue
as an "open question." This implies that if faced with the proper case,
the Florida Supreme Court might follow the United States Supreme
Court and adopt use and derivative use as the standard mandated by
the Florida Constitution.
This statement by the Florida Supreme Court is especially important
when viewed in the context of the other recent developments in
Florida immunity law. During the 1977 legislative session, a move
187. The issue of whether the papers would he suppressed under the fifth amend-
ment was reserved for the trial court. The ultimate question of whether the fifth
amendment applies to these papers will be an interesting one indeed. Florida cases have
generally given a broad interpretation to the fifth amendment insofar as it concerns
the compelled production of personal documents. A good example can be found in
State v. Dawson, 290 So. 2d 79, 82-83 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1974): "We think there is
no difference whatever in compelling a man to be a witness against himself and in seiz-
ing his records to be used against him. They are both constitutionally protected rights."
The Tsavaris majority indicated that it felt the recent United States Supreme Court
decision in Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391 (1976), severely undercut the Dawson
rationale. No. 48, 637, slip op. at n.8. See also Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463 (1976).
188. No. 48,637, slip op. at 7 n.6. (emphasis added).
189. See text accompanying notes 170-75 supra.
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was made to replace the current transactional immunity statute with
a use and derivative use statute cast in the federal mode. Although no
legislation was enacted, bills filed in both houses gained substantial
support."' ° Apparently, a significant number of state legislators were
inclined to have Florida follow the federal lead and adopt a use and
derivative use immunity standard. This issue will undoubtedly recur
in future legislative sessions.
3. Conclusions. For many years, immunity statutes have been
used as a constitutionally approved method to obtain information re-
garding criminal conduct. Originally, the courts required that one
who was compelled to testify be given the broadest immunity possible-
complete transactional immunity. Though the Supreme Court's broad
language in Counselman technically may have been dictum, the Court's
intent seemed clear: the only immunity coextensive with the fifth
amendment was transactional immunity.191 This same theme was re-
peated many times until the Court in Kastigar narrowed the constitu-
tional standard to use and derivative use immunity. Note that the
Court in Kastigar did not hold that transactional immunity was un-
constitutional; it merely concluded that the United States Constitu-
tion required only use and derivative use immunity.
One of the major criticisms leveled at the use and derivative use
standard is that it is difficult (if indeed possible) to enforce. Under
the standard set forth in Murphy and Kastigar, the government has
the burden of proving that its information was derived from "in-
dependent sources" and not from compelled testimony. Critics argue
that even without intentional abuses by the government, "human
fallibility" will allow compelled testimony to become intermingled
and used along with other legitimate government leads.192 In addition,
190. The use and derivative use immunity bill originated in the Senate and was
sponsored by Senator Dunn. Fla. S. 19 (1977). A similar bill in the House was spon-
sored by Representative Haben. Fla. H.R. 1114 (1977). Both bills received overwhelming
support in their respective houses. The House passed its bill by a vote of 115 to 2 and
sent it to the Senate where it was amended and passed by a vote of 39 to 1. FLA. H.R.
JOUR. 216 (1977); FLA. S. JouR. 216 (1977). The House refused to concur in the Senate
amendments and the bill died upon adjournment sine die. FLA. H.R. JOUR. 373 (1977).
Interestingly, the Senate amendment in which the House refused to concur provided that
a witness could have counsel present in the grand jury room when he testified. FLA. S.
JouR. 217 (1977).
191. Indeed, if the Court in Counselman had felt that use and derivative use was
the appropriate standard, it could have limited its decision by saying that the statute
in question failed because it did not protect a witness against the use of the fruits of
his testimony. The Court chose to cast its opinion in the broad language of transactional
immunity. Note, Scope of Testimonial Immunity, supra note 165, at 361.
192. Consider Justice Brennan's dissent in Piccirillo v. New York, 400 U.S. 548, 568
(1971):
[A]ll the relevant evidence will obviously be in the hands of the government-the
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it has been suggested that when the government learns of a certain
witness' involvement in a crime, its burden of establishing the case
on its own has been substantially lessened; if nothing more, the com-
pelled testimony aids the government in deciding whether it can
establish a case against the witness. 193
Another area discussed by commentators concerns the effect that
Harris v. New York194 will have on use and derivative use immunity.
In Harris, the Court held that statements obtained in violation of the
Miranda rule could nevertheless be used to impeach the defendant if
he took the stand. Although the Kastigar Court stated that the statute
"provides a sweeping proscription of any use, direct or indirect, of
the compelled testimony and any information derived therefrom, ' 195
one wonders whether under Harris, Kastigar might be extended to
allow compelled statements before a grand jury to be used for the
limited purpose of impeachment. 19 6
Finally, there exists a genuine question whether use and derivative
use immunity will be a better tool for fighting crime than transactional
immunity. The argument is often made that immunity statutes are
especially necessary for the detection and investigation of organized
crime.' ,97 At least one author has taken issue with this view.
Although the Administration's ostensible social justification for use
immunity was that it was essential to the fight against organized
crime, use immunity, or any other form of immunity, is largely
valueless in such cases. The Mafia's omert code, which can be
government whose investigation included compelling the individual involved to
incriminate himself. Moreover, this argument does not depend on assumptions
of misconduct or collusion among government officers. It assumes only the normal
margin of human fallibility. Men working in the same office or department ex-
change information without recording carefully how they obtained certain in-
formation; it is often impossible to remember in retrospect how or when or from
whom information was obtained.
193. See Note, Scope of Testimonial immunity, supra note 165, at 374.
194. 401 U.S. 222 (1971).
195. 406 U.S. at 460.
196. See Note, Scope of Testimonial Immunity, supra note 165, at 380. Neither trans-
actional nor use and derivative use immunity protects from subsequent prosecution for
perjury a witness who lies to a grand jury. It would seem that since the fifth amend-
ment is not a license to commit perjury, then there would be no difference between the
two types of immunity for purposes of impeachment. See discussion supra note 92.
197. PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE,
TASK FORCE REPORT: ORGANIZED CRIME 80 (1967):
Above all else, the testimony of witnesses is indispensible in the prosecution of
organized crime. The existing legal tools available to develop such testimony need
to be strengthened, and alternatives need to be sanctioned . . . . Immunity grant
and similar legislation must be broadened.
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roughly translated as "death to informers," makes a few months in
jail for contempt of court a comparative slap on the wrist.198
This supports the view of some commentators that, unlike trans-
actional immunity statutes, use and derivative use statutes will actually
hamper the criminal investigatory process. Their view is that if
witnesses who have something to hide realize that their compelled
testimony may in some way be used against them, then they may
view contempt sanctions as the lesser of the two evils and remain
silent in spite of the immunity grant.199
V. CONCLUSIONS & PROPOSALS
The grand jury indictment system has, by historical accident, sur-
vived until the present day, even though its original protective func-
tions no longer exist in fact. Quite the opposite from its original pro-
tective purpose, the grand jury has become one of the prosecutor's
tools-a tool which often works to the detriment of individual rights.
In addition to its abuse potential, the grand jury serves little practical
purpose since any independence it may have, in theory, is squelched
by the state attorney's dominance of the proceeding.
In Florida, grand jury indictments are required only for capital
crimes. Although other crimes may be prosecuted by indictment, it
should be noted that if a grand jury fails to indict on a non-capital
crime, the state attorney may still initiate a criminal prosecution by
filing an information. Thus, with the narrow exception of capital
crimes,"20 the Florida prosecuting attorney already has the final de-
termination concerning which cases will be brought to trial. At best,
the Florida grand jury system is an unnecessary, but harmless, pre-
trial procedure. At worst, it is a wasteful, expensive, and dilatory ritual
creating an illusion of protection of individual rights. Since 1934,
Florida state attorneys have routinely charged serious crimes by means
of information rather than indictment. The step to prosecuting all
crimes by information would not be a difficult one. The grand jury
requirement in the Florida Constitution should be abolished.
198. Harris, Annals of Law: Taking the Fifth-Part II, THE NEw YORKER, April 12,
1976, at 99-100.
199. Note, Scope of Testimonial Immunity, supra note 165, at 383. See Harris,
Annals of Law: Taking the Fifth-Part I, THE NEW YORKER, April 5, 1976, at 44. See also
Harris, Annals of Law: Taking the Fifth-Part lIl, THE NEW YORKER, April 19, 1976, at
42.
200. Currently, the only capital crimes in Florida are first-degree murder and sexual
battery of a child under 11 by a person 18 or older. See FLA. STAT. §§ 782.04, 794.011(2).
The death sentence for rape is of questionable constitutionality following the United
States Supreme Court ruling in Coker v. Georgia, 97 S. Ct. 2861 (1977).
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Article I, section 15(a) of the Florida Constitution could be
amended so as to do away with grand jury indictments altogether,2 0
or to allow all crimes to be prosecuted by either indictment or infor-
mation.2 0 2 The first option would presumably require that all crimes
be prosecuted by information-a step that no state has yet taken. The
second would put Florida in the same position as some twenty-four
other states, but would make little change in Florida grand jury law.
The only difference would be that capital crimes could be prosecuted
by indictment or information. It should be noted that under this
approach, the prosecutor could still hide behind the grand jury on
unpopular issues. The first option-requiring all crimes to be prose-
cuted by information-makes better sense and should be adopted.
If the grand jury indictment system is retained in any form in the
Florida Constitution, then additional provisions should be included
in the constitution to protect those who come into contact with the
grand jury. First, a witness called to testify before a grand jury should
be permitted to have counsel present with him in the grand jury
room.20 3 This would allow a witness to avoid the incriminating in-
nuendo of having to leave the room after each question to consult with
counsel in the hall. Allowing counsel to be present as a "passive
advisor" along the lines of the ABA proposal would not unduly disrupt
the proceedings. On the contrary, having counsel present would
expedite the grand jury proceedings; the proceedings would not have
to be halted while the witness left the room to consult with counsel.
Since the witness can divulge all of the questions to his counsel anyway,
the attorney's presence would not violate the grand jury's secrecy. The
201. A proposal might read: "All crimes shall be prosecuted by information under
oath by the prosecuting officer of the court .... "
202. An example might be: "All crimes may be prosecuted either by indictment or
by information .... "
203. Such a provision might be patterned after the Kansas statutory provision, which
reads:
(1) Any person called to testify before a grand jury must be informed that
he has a right to be advised by counsel and that he may not be required to make
any statement which will incriminate him. Upon a request by such person for
counsel, no further examination of the witness shall take place until counsel is
present. In the event that counsel of the witness' choice is not available, he shall
be required to obtain other counsel within three (3) days in order that the
work of the grand jury may proceed. If such person is indigent and unable to
obtain the services of counsel, the court shall appoint counsel to assist him . ...
(2) Counsel for any witness may be present while the witness is testifying
and may interpose objections on behalf of the witness. He shall not be permitted
to examine or cross-examine his client or any other witness before the grand jury.
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-3009 (1974).
Any provision adopted should provide that a witness before a grand jury has a
right to have counsel and not merely to retain counsel. The latter language would allow
only those who could afford an attorney to have counsel present.
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state attorney would merely be denied the psychological advantage
of having the witness separated from his counsel.
The constitution should also include a provision guaranteeing
transactional immunity to a witness who is compelled to testify over
the assertion of his privilege against self-incrimination.204 This would
have the effect of elevating to the level of constitutional right an in-
dividual protection which Florida has recognized by statute for many
years. Such a move is necessitated by the restrictive approach that the
United States Supreme Court has recently taken toward immunity
and the fifth amendment. Making transactional immunity a right under
the state constitution would guarantee that Florida will not follow the
federal lead and deviate from its established policy of broad immunity
for those who are forced to testify against their will. In addition, it
should be reiterated that some authorities believe that transactional
immunity is actually a better crime-fighting tool than use and derivative
use immunity.
In closing, it must be emphasized that the need to guarantee these
safeguards, namely, counsel in grand jury proceedings and transactional
immunity, by constitutional provision is especially acute. Neither has
been recognized under the United States Constitution; if they are to
exist at all, they must come from the states.10 5
ROBERT Q. WILLIAMS
204. The transactional immunity provision could be patterned after the current
Florida immunity statute, supra note 145, or after the provision in the Oklahoma Con-
stitution, supra note 178.
205. See generally Brennan, State Constitutions And The Protection of Individual
Rights, 90 HARV. L. REV. 489 (1977). In his article, Mr. Justice Brennan recognizes that
the protection of individual rights is becoming increasingly the province of state con-
stitutional law.
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APPENDIX I
VARIOUS STATE PROVISIONS DEALING WITH THE
INITIATION OF CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS
Alabama-All felonies must be prosecuted by grand jury indictment. Misdemeanors
may, if authorized by the legislature, be prosecuted by information. Indictment may be
dispensed with if the defendant chooses to plead guilty. ALA. CONST. art. I, § 8 and
amend. 37.
Alaska-Grand jury indictments are required for all "capital or infamous" crimes. The
indictment may be waived by the accused. ALAS. CONST. art. I, § 8.
Arizona-All crimes may be prosecuted by information or indictment; provided that
if a felony is prosecuted by information, there must have been a preliminary examination
before a magistrate. ARiz. CONST. art. II, § 30.
Arkansas-All crimes may be prosecuted by indictment or information. ARK. CONST.
art. II, § 8.
California-Felonies may be prosecuted by either indictment or information. If
prosecuted by information, it must be after an examination and commitment by a
magistrate. CAL. CONsT. art. I, § 14.
Colorado-The constitution provides that all felonies must be prosecuted by indict-
ment, unless otherwise provided by law. Colorado has provided by statute that all
crimes may be prosecuted by indictment or information. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 16-5-10
(1973).
Connecticut-All crimes punishable by death or life imprisonment must be prosecuted
by grand jury indictment. CONN. CONST. art. I, § 8.
Delaware-All "indictable offenses" must be prosecuted by indictment. DEL. CONST.
art. I, § 8.
Florida-All capital crimes must be charged by indictment; all other crimes may be
prosecuted by indictment or information. FLA. CONST. art. I, § 15(a).
Georgia-All felonies must be prosecuted by indictment. However, for noncapital
crimes, the accused may be prosecuted by information, provided he waives in writing
his right to grand jury indictment. All other crimes may be prosecuted by information.
GA. CODE ANN. § 27-704 (1976).
Hawaii-Indictment by grand jury is required for the prosecution of all "capital or
otherwise infamous" crimes. HAWAII CONST. art. I, § 8.
Idaho-Felonies may be prosecuted by indictment or information; provided that if
by information, the accused must have first been examined by a magistrate. IDAHO CONST.
art. I, § 8.
Illinois-All prosecutions of felonies may be by indictment or information; provided
that if by information, the accused must have either had or waived his right to a
preliminary hearing. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, §§ 111-2 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1977).
Indiana-All crimes may be prosecuted by indictment or information. IND. CODE ANN.
§ 35-3.1-1-1 (Burns 1975).
Iowa-The constitution says that all crimes where punishment exceeds $100 fine or
30 days imprisonment must be charged by indictment. However, in apparent conflict
is a 1977 statutory provision allowing all crimes to be prosecuted by either indictment
or information. IOWA CODE ANN. § 769.1 (Supp. 1977).
Kansas-All crimes greater than misdemeanors must be prosecuted by indictment.
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-2303 (1974).
Kentucky-All "indictable offenses" must be prosecuted by indictment. Ky. CONST.
Bill of Rights, § 12.
Louisiana-Felonies may be prosecuted by indictment or information, but capital
and life felonies must be prosecuted by indictment. LA. CONST. art. I, § 15.
Maine-All capital or infamous crimes must be prosecuted by indictment. ME. CONST.
art. I, § 7.
Maryland-There is no constitutional provision. A statute provides that in all felony
prosecutions, the accused has 10 days to request a preliminary hearing. If he does not,
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or if he waives it, or if a magistrate determines that probable cause exists, then the
prosecutor may charge the crime by information. MD. CODE ANN. § 23-592 (1973).
Massachusetts-All crimes may be prosecuted either by indictment or complaint. MAss.
GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 263, § 4 (Supp. 1977).
Michigan-All crimes may be prosecuted by either indictment or information. MICH.
COMP. LAWS ANN. § 767.1 (1968).
Minnesota-Any crime punishable by life imprisonment must be prosecuted by a
grand jury indictment. MINN. R. CRIM. P. 17.01.
Mississippi-All "indictable offenses" must be prosecuted by indictment; provided
that in cases not punishable by death or penitentiary imprisonment, the legislature may
dispense with the grand jury. As of this writing, no action has been taken to dispense
with the grand jury. Miss. CONST. art. 1II, § 27.
Missouri-All crimes may be prosecuted by either indictment or information. Mo.
CONST. art. I, § 17.
Montana-All lower court crimes may be prosecuted by complaint. All district court
crimes may be prosecuted by indictment or by information; provided that if by in-
formation, the accused must have been examined and committed by a magistrate, or
leave of court must have been given. MONT. CONsT. art. II, § 20.
Nebraska-The constitution requires indictments for felonies, but allows the legislature
to permit informations. The legislature has provided that all crimes may be prosecuted
by either information or indictment. NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-1601 (1975).
New Hampshire-All capital crimes with punishments of more than one year in
prison must be prosecuted by indictment. The accused may waive indictment except
for capital crimes. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 601:1 (1974).
New Jersey-All crimes must be prosecuted by grand jury indictment. N.J. CONST.
art. I, § 8.
New Mexico-All crimes may be prosecuted by indictment or information; provided
that if by information, the accused shall have had or waived a preliminary examination
before a magistrate. N.M. CONsT. art. II, § 14.
New York-All capital or otherwise infamous crimes must be prosecuted by indict-
ment. However, for all such crimes except capital or life imprisonment crimes, the
accused may waive the indictment. N.Y. CONsT. art. I, § 6.
Nevada-All capital or infamous crimes may be prosecuted by indictment or informa-
tion. NEv. CONsT. art. I, § 8.
North Carolina-All crimes greater than misdemeanors must be initiated by indict-
ment. However, a person represented by counsel in a noncapital case may waive his
right to indictment. N.C. CONsT. art. I, § 22.
North Dakota-The constitution provides for all felonies to be tried by indictment
unless otherwise provided by law. Criminal Rule 7(a) provides that all crimes may now
be prosecuted by indictment or information. N.D. R. CRIM. P. 7(a).
Ohio-All capital or otherwise infamous crimes must be initiated by grand jury
indictment. OHIO CONST. art. I, § 10.
Oregon-All felonies must be prosecuted by indictment unless the accused waives
indictment, has a preliminary hearing, or waives his right to a preliminary hearing.
ORE. CONsT. art. VII (amended), § 5.
Oklahoma-All crimes may be prosecuted by indictment or information. However, if
a felony is prosecuted by information, the accused must have had or waived a preliminary
examination before a magistrate. OKLA. CONST. art. II, § 17.
Pennsylvania-All "indictable offenses" must be prosecuted by indictment. PA. CONST.
art. I, § 10.
Rhode Island-All capital and life felonies must be tried by indictment, and all
other felonies may be prosecuted by indictment or information. R.I. CONST. amend.
40, § 1.
South Carolina-All crimes having penalties of more than $200 or imprisonment for
30 days must be prosecuted by indictment. The General Assembly may provide for
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waiver of indictment. It has not done so as of this writing. S.C. CONST. art. IV, § 10.
South Dakota-All criminal offenses must be prosecuted by indictment or informa-
tion. The grand jury may be abolished by law. It has not been abolished as of this
writing. S.D. CONST. art. VI, § 10.
Tennessee-No person shall answer to any criminal charge other than by present-
ment, indictment, or impeachment. TENN. CONsT. art. I, § 14.
Texas-All criminal offenses must be tried by indictment except in cases where
the punishment is by fine or imprisonment in other than the penitentiary. TEXAS CONST.
art. I, § 10.
Utah-Offenses formerly required to be prosecuted by indictment shall be prosecuted
by information after examination and commitment by a magistrate, unless the examina-
tion is waived. All crimes may be prosecuted by indictment. UTAH CONST. art. I, § 13.
Vermont-All crimes may be prosecuted by information or indictment at the option
of the prosecutor. Leave of court is not required for an information. VT. R. CRIM. P.
7(a).
Virginia-All felonies must be prosecuted by indictment unless the accused waives
the indictment in writing. VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-217 (1975).
Washington-Offenses formerly required to be prosecuted by indictment may be
prosecuted by information or indictment. WASH. CONST. art. I, § 25.
West Virginia-Felonies must be prosecuted by indictment. W. VA. CODE ANN. § 62-2-I
(1977).
Wisconsin-Felonies may be prosecuted either by indictment or information. Wisc.
STAT. ANN. § 967.05(3) (1971).
Wyoming-The constitution provides for all felonies to be prosecuted by indictment
unless otherwise provided by law. The legislature has provided that all crimes may be
prosecuted by indictment or information. Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 7-118 (1959).
